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ABSTRACT 
Evaluating the Risk of Water Main Failure Using a Hierarchical Fuzzy Expert 
System 
Hussam A. Fares 
Water distribution systems are the most expensive part of the water supply infrastructure 
system. In Canada and the United States, there are 700 water main breakae every day, 
and there have been more than 2 million breaks since the beginning of this century, which 
have cost more than 6 billion Canadian dollars in repairs costs for the two countries. 
Municipalities and other authorities that manage potable water infrastructure often must 
prioritize the rehabilitation needs of their water main. This is a serious challenge because 
the current potable water networks are old (i.e. deteriorated) and require certain 
modifications to bring them up to acceptable reliability and safety levels within a limited 
budget. In other words, municipalities need to develop a balanced rehabilitation plan to 
increase the reliability of their water networks by rehabilitating (first) only those 
pipelines at high risk of failure. 
The objective of this research is to develop a risk model for water main failure, which 
evaluates the risk associated with each pipeline in the network. This model considers four 
main factors: environmental, physical, operational, and post-failure factors (consequences 
of failure) and sixteen sub-factors which represent the main factors. Data are collected to 
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serve two purposes: to build the model and to show its implementation to case studies. 
The required data are collected from literature review and through a questionnaire sent to 
the experts in the field of water distribution network management. From the collected 
data, pipe age is found to have the most significant indication of water main failure risk, 
followed by pipe material and breakage rate. In order to develop the risk of failure model, 
hierarchical fuzzy expert system (HFES) technique is used to process the input data, 
which is the effect of risk factors, and generate the risk of failure index of each water 
main. In order to verify the developed model, a validated AHP deterioration model and 
two real water distribution network data sets are used to check the results of the 
developed model. The results of the verification show that the Average Validity Percent 
is 74.8 %, which is reasonable considering the uncertainty involved in the collected data. 
Based on the developed model, an application is built that uses Excel ® 2007 software to 
predict the risk of failure index. At last, three case studies are evaluated using the 
developed application to estimate the risk of failure associated with the distribution water 
mains. 
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C h a p t e r I: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Problem Statement 
The water distribution system is considered to be the most expensive part of the water 
supply infrastructure system (Giustolisi et al. 2006). In a recent survey conducted by the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency, it is estimated that $77 billion will be 
needed to repair and rehabilitate the water main over the next 20 years (Selvakumar et al. 
2002). In Canada and the United States, there have been more than 2 million breaks since 
January 2000, costing more than 6 billion Canadian dollars in repair costs on an average 
of 700 water main breaks every day (Infrastructure Report, 2007). Moreover, providing 
communities with safe water through a reliable water network has become more and 
more a topic of concern. Water distribution networks are buried pipelines and as a result, 
they have received little attention from decision makers. The breakage rate and the high 
associated costs of failure have reached a level that now draws the attention of both the 
public and the decision makers. As a result, dealing with the risk of water main failure 
has been undergoing a great change in concept from reacting to failure events to taking 
preventive actions that maintain the water main in good working condition. 
The risk of failure is defined as the combination of the probability and the impact severity 
of a particular circumstance that negatively affects the ability of infrastructure assets to 
meet the objectives of the municipality (InfraGuide, 2006). Risk of water main failure 
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factors can be divided broadly into deterioration and consequence (post failure) factors. 
The deterioration factors are either responsible for deterioration of the potable water 
distribution network or they can give an indication of the level of network deterioration. 
Environmental, physical, and operational factors are included within the deterioration 
framework. Consequence or post failure factors represent the cost of water main failure 
and should be considered when evaluating the risk of pipeline failure. Municipalities and 
other authorities must build long-term and short-term management plans that prioritize 
the rehabilitation of the water works within their limited budgets in order to upgrade the 
status of their water main networks. Thus, it is crucial to apply management strategies to 
upgrade, repair, and maintain the potable water network. These strategies should be built 
on scientific approaches that consider the risk of pipeline failure in tandem with all of the 
failure factors. 
1.2. Research Objectives 
The objectives of the current research can be summarized as follows: 
• Design a risk of water main failure model to evaluate the risk associated with 
each pipeline in the network. 
• Propose a failure risk scale that provides guidance to decision makers. 
• Develop an automated tool that helps water system managers make their short 
and long terms management plans. 
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1.3. Research Methodology 
The research methodology consists of several stages. It starts with a comprehensive 
literature review of the risk of water main failure followed by data collection (model 
information data and case study data). Next, a hierarchical fuzzy expert system (HFES) is 
developed based on the collected model information data. A failure risk scale is proposed 
that will guide the network operators on how to best manage their networks. Then, the 
developed model and application is tested and verified. After that, three case studies 
application is analyzed which utilize the developed model to assess the risk of failure of 
the water distribution network. An Excel-based application is built to allow the developed 
model to be used by municipalities and other authorities to manage their water main. 
1.3.1. Literature Review 
All the topics related to the risk of water main failure are reviewed in order to have a 
better overview of the topic and how to achieve the research objective. In the literature 
review, many topics are studied such as: water main classification, risk of pipeline 
failure, risk evaluation process and modeling approaches, risk of water main failure, 
fuzzy logic, and failure risk scales. 
1.3.2. Data Collection 
The data collection consists of two stages that are required to develop the water main 
failure risk model and to run it. In stage one, the data is collected from many sources such 
as the literature review and experts via a questionnaire collected from twenty experts. The 
data collected is the weights of various factors to be incorporated in the model and the 
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performance of each factor. In stage two, data from case studies are collected from real 
networks under operation and are presented to the developed model to assess the water 
main failure risk. 
1.3.3. Hierarchical Fuzzy Expert System Model 
A model is developed to evaluate the risk of water main failure. The developed model 
considers four main risk factors which have sixteen sub-factors that represent both 
deterioration of the water distribution network and the failure consequences. In the light 
of the literature review, a failure risk scale is proposed to help decision makers in water 
resources management (i.e. companies, municipalities) make informed decisions and 
establish their rehabilitation plans. The developed model is analyzed and verified and the 
results show that the model is robust and reliable. 
1.4. Thesis Organization 
As stated earlier, the main objective of this research is to build a water main failure risk 
model using fuzzy expert system. Accordingly, the thesis is organized to achieve this 
objective. 
The literature review is compiled and organized in Chapter II, including water main 
classification, risk of water main failure, risk evaluation process and modeling 
approaches. Fuzzy logic literature is also reviewed, along with its application in the field 
of pipeline management, together with expert opinions. 
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Chapter III gives an overview of the research methodology followed in this research. 
Moreover, it includes an overview of the developed hierarchical fuzzy expert system 
model for water main failure risk and the Excel-based application development. 
Chapter IV describes the data collection process. Data are needed in order to perform two 
tasks: to build the model and to apply a case study using the developed model. 
Chapter V explains the developed failure risk model. It introduces the risk factors 
incorporated into the model, the definition of the fuzzy sets for each factor, the 
development of the hierarchical model, the fuzzy rules extraction, and the fuzzy 
defuzzification. Moreover, the development of a failure risk index scale is described in 
this chapter. The application of the case studies to the developed system is also presented. 
Three case studies are introduced, processed and analyzed using the developed system. In 
addition, the process of sensitivity analysis and verification of the developed 
model/system is described in this chapter. 
Chapter VI explains the developed application. It is based on Excel ® 2007 software. 
This section explains the different parts of the application and how to use it. 
Chapter VII presents the conclusions and recommendations. It includes the limitations of 
the developed model and application, research contribution, research enhancement and 
extension of the research in the future. 
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Chapter II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Distribution networks often account for up to 80% of the total expenditure involved in 
water supply systems (Kleiner and Rajani, 2000). The breakage rates of the water main 
increase and their hydraulic capacity decreases as the pipelines deteriorate. Engineering 
systems are designed, constructed, and operated under unavoidable conditions of risk and 
uncertainty. In order to solve the risk of water main failure problem, many topics are 
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11.1. Water Main Classification 
Water main can be classified depending on its characteristics by following 
various approaches such as: by material, diameter, function. In this context, the 
pipelines' different classifications are shown as follows: 
11.1.1. Classification by Material 
Mainly, there are three main categories of pipeline materials that are used in the 
construction of pressurized pipelines. They are: Cement-Based pipes, Plastic 
pipes, and Metallic pipes. Each category of pipeline material contains a variety 
of materials (Najafi, 2005). Steel, cast iron (CI), ductile iron (DI), reinforced 
concrete (RC), pre-stressed concrete cylinder pipe (PCCP), and asbestos cement 
(AC) are used in the construction of large-diameter water mains, whereas more 
recently, polyvinyl chloride (PVC) and polyethylene (PE) pipes have been 
widely used, especially in the lower diameter range (Rajani et al. 2006). It is 
worth mentioning that there is another type of pipeline material, Verified Clay, 
which is only used in sewer pipelines due to its low tensile strength. 
11.1.2. Classification by Diameter 
Water main can be classified according to its diameter into three groups: small 
diameter (2 in. to 8 in. or 50 mm to 203 mm), medium diameter (10 in. to 30 in. 
or 254 mm to 762 mm), and large diameter (36 in. to 72 in. or 914 mm to 1829 
mm) (Raven, 2007). Pipelines are classified depending on the structural 
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behavior of the pipeline. For instance, large diameter pipes have more beam 
strength than small diameter pipes (Najafi, 2005). 
II.1.3. Classification by Function 
Water main can be classified according to its function into two main categories: 
transmission and distribution lines. The function of transmission pipelines is to 
transfer water from a main source to a storage system (i.e. water tanks). They are 
considered the most expensive part of the system because of their higher initial 
construction costs (i.e. material, installation, equipments). The function of 
distribution lines is to carry water out from the storage system to the domestic 
users (i.e. residential buildings or industrial factories). The minimum diameter 
for a distribution pipe is two inches, and the minimum diameter required for 
serving fire hydrants is six inches (Al Barqawi, 2006). 
II.2. Risk of Water Main Failure 
II.2.1. Risk Definition 
Risk is defined by InfraGuide (2006) as the combination of the probability and 
impact severity of a particular circumstance that negatively affects the ability of 
infrastructure assets to meet the objectives of the municipality. Moreover, the 
probability is defined as the likelihood of an event occurring. 
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There are many other risk definitions that share the same concept. Some are 
given by Kirchhoff and Doberstein (2006) as: 
• The potential for the realization of unwanted, adverse consequences to 
human life, health, property, and/or the environment. 
• A measure of economic loss or human injury in terms of both the incident 
likelihood and the magnitude of the loss or injury. 
• A measure of the probability and magnitude of adverse consequences. 
The same authors also stated some definitions of risk assessment as: 
• The process by which the form, dimension, and characteristics of risks are 
estimated, and 
• The process of gathering information about adverse effects in a structured 
way and the forming of a judgment about them. 
Risk assessment is also defined by (InfraGuide, 2006) as the analysis of the 
severity of the potential loss and the probability that the loss will occur, leading 
to the quantification of impacts. 
There is not yet a single international consent about the definition of risk or risk 
assessment terminology; however, all of the definitions have almost the same 
implicit meaning. Several risk assessment methods are used in the industry. The 
selection of a method depends on many factors, such as: system complexity, 
availability of historical data, and the validity required by the analysis. The most 
common are failure probability methods and ranking systems (Mohitpour et al. 
2003). 
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The difference between risk assessment and risk management is that risk 
assessment tries to answer the following questions: 
• What can go wrong? 
• What is the likelihood that it would go wrong? 
• What are the consequences? 
While risk management continues this process by additionally attempting to 
answer the following questions: 
• What can be done and what options are available? 
• What are the associated trade-offs in terms of the costs, benefits, 
and risks? 
• What are the impacts of current management decisions on future 
options? (Haimes, 2004). 
II.2.2. Failure of a Water Distribution System 
Failure of a pipeline can be defined as the unintentional release of pipeline 
contents or loss of integrity. However, a pipeline can fail in other ways that do 
not involve a loss of contents. Failure to perform a pipeline's intended function 
is a more general definition of pipeline failure (Muhlbauer, 2004). The more 
precise definition of pipeline failure is the inability to satisfy basic requirements 
from the distribution system, failure to satisfy customer demand or failure to 
maintain pressures within specific limits. The types of water distribution failure 
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can be categorized into: 1) performance failure and 2) mechanical failure 
(Ozger, 2003). 
There are many causes of performance failure. A principle cause is when the 
actual demand on the network exceeds the network capacity (design demand). 
Another cause is when the hydraulic capacity of the network is reduced below 
the actual demand due to the network's deterioration with age. Performance 
failure is also called demand variation failure or demand failure. The second 
general type of failure is mechanical failure, which is associated with the failure 
of components of the distribution system such as pipes, pumps, control valves, 
treatment plant, and supervisory and data acquisition system. The most common 
type of mechanical failure is pipe failure (Ozger, 2003). The causes of pipe 
failure are categorized into time-dependant (dynamic), static, and operational 
factors. Examples of non-static factors are pipe age, soil moisture, temperature, 
and soil electrical resistivity. Examples of static factors are pipe material, pipe 
diameter, surrounding soil type, and internal pressure, whereas replacement 
rates, cathodic protection, and water pressure are examples of operational 
factors. These factors are shown in Table II. 1 (Kleiner and Rajani, 2000; Kleiner 
and Rajani, 2002; Kleiner et al. 2006; Pelletier et al. 2003). InfraGuide (2003) 
summarized the structural failure modes for each of the common water main 
materials as shown in Table II.2. Failure occurs mainly when structural 
deterioration of a pipe reduces its capacity to resist stresses imposed on it by 
external and internal factors (Sadiq et al. 2004). 
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Table II.2 - Structural failure modes for common water main materials (InfraGuide, 2003). 
Water Main Material 
Cast Iron (CI) 
Small diam (<375 mm) 
Large diam (>500 mm) 
Medium diam (375-500 mm) 
Ductile Iron (DI) 
Steel 
Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) 
High Density 
Polyethylene (HDPE) 
Asbestos Cement (AC) 
Concrete Pressure Pipe 
(CPP) 
Structural Failure Modes 
• Circumferential breaks, split bell, corrosion through 
holes 
• Longitudinal breaks, bell shear, corrosion through holes 
• Same as small, plus longitudinal breaks and spiral 
cracking, blown section 
• Corrosion through holes 
• Corrosion through holes, large diameter pipes are 
susceptible to collapse 
• Longitudinal breaks due to excessive mechanical stress 
• Susceptible to impact failure in extreme cold condition 
(i.e. far north) 
• Joint imperfections, mechanical degradation from 
improper installation methods, susceptible to vacuum 
collapse for lower pressure ratings 
• Circumferential breaks, pipe degradation in aggressive 
water 
• Longitudinal splits 
• Pipes with pre-stressed wires may experience ruptures 
due to loss of pre-stressing upon multiple wire failure. 
• Pipe degradation in particularly aggressive soils, 
corrosion of pipe canister, concrete damage due to 
improper installation methods 
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Sources of failure can be categorized into five groups (InfraGuide, 2006): 
1- Natural occurring events: like fire, storm, flood, and earthquake. The 
timing of these types of events is unknown and uncontrollable but their 
probability and severity can be statistically predicted. 
2- External impacts: as a result of failure by an outside party such as power 
failure, spills, labor strike. This source of risk is unpredictable making it 
difficult to calculate the probability of failure. However, the 
consequences can be mitigated by management plans. 
3- External aggressions: deliberate acts of terrorism that results in 
destruction of assets. The consequences of failure can be reduced through 
security and protection programs to the strategically important facilities. 
4- Aging infrastructure and physical deterioration: the condition of the 
infrastructure and its deterioration can be predicted and determined. Many 
factors contribute to a pipeline's deterioration. These factors are 
categorized into three groups: Physical factors, Environmental factors, 
and Operational factors as shown in Table II.3 (InfraGuide, 2003). 
5- Operation risk of failure: this category arises as a result of the way the 
infrastructure is designed, managed, and operated to meet the 
organizational objectives. It includes design standards risks, management 
policies, and operator behavior. This risk can be reduced through pro-
active condition and performance assessment and inspection of assets at 
regular intervals and through preventive maintenance programs. 
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Pipes made from different materials fail in different ways. 
Corrosion will penetrate thinner walled pipe more quickly. 
Effects of pipe degradation become more apparent over time. 
Pipes made at a particular time and place may be more vulnerable to 
failure. 
Small diameter pipes are more susceptible to beam failure. 
Some types of joints have experienced premature failure. 
Inadequate restraint can increase longitudinal stresses. 
Lined and coated pipes are less susceptible to corrosion. 
Dissimilar metals are susceptible to galvanic corrosion. 
Poor installation practices can damage pipes, making them vulnerable to 
failure. 
Defects in pipe walls produced by manufacturing errors can make pipes 
vulnerable to failure. This problem is most common in older pit cast pipes. 
Improper bedding may result in premature pipe failure. 
Some backfill materials are corrosive or frost susceptible. 
Some soils are corrosive; some soils experience significant volume 
changes in response to moisture changes, resulting in changes to pipe 
loading. Presence of hydrocarbons and solvents in soil may result in some 
pipe deterioration. 
Some groundwater is aggressive toward certain pipe materials. 
Climate influences frost penetration and soil moisture. Permafrost must be 
considered in the north. 
Migration of road salt into soil can increase the rate of corrosion. 
Underground disturbances in the immediate vicinity of an existing pipe 
can lead to actual damage or changes in the support and loading structure 
on the pipe. 
Stray currents cause electrolytic corrosion. 
Seismic activity can increase stresses on pipes and cause pressure surges. 
Changes to internal water pressure will change stresses acting on a pipe. 
Leakage erodes pipe bedding and increases soil moisture in the pipe zone. 
Some water is aggressive, promoting corrosion 
Rate of internal corrosion is greater in unlined dead-ended mains. 
Cross connections with systems that do not contain potable water can 
contaminate water distribution systems. 
Poor practices can compromise structural integrity and water quality. 
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II.2.3. Consequences of Failure 
A judgment of the potential consequences is inherent in any risk evaluation. This 
is the answer to the question of: if something goes wrong, what are the 
consequences? Consequence implies a loss of some kind. Losses can be 
quantified, in terms of damaged buildings, vehicles, and other property; costs of 
service interruption; cost of the lost product; cost of the cleanup; and so on. The 
consequences of failure are categorized into two groups: direct and indirect 
consequences as shown in Table II.4 (Muhlbauer, 2004; Bhave, 2003). 
Table II.4 - Categories of failure consequences. 
Direct consequences 
• Property damages 
• Damages to human health 
• Environmental damages 
• Loss of product 
• Repair costs 
• Cleanup and remediation costs 
Indirect consequences 
• Litigation and contract 
violations, 
• Customer dissatisfaction, 
• Political reactions, 
• Loss of market share, and 
• Government fines and penalties. 
Some of these consequences are monetized in a straightforward process. 
However, for indirect consequences and environmental damages, it is more 
difficult to quantify the consequences with a monetary value (Muhlbauer, 2004). 
The consequences of failure are different among pipelines and vary with time 
relative to a business cycle. They are also affected by pipeline flow load and by 
the generated revenue from a pipeline (Nikolaidis et al. 2005). 
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Skipworth et al. (2001) made a comparison between the Whole Life Costing 
(WLC) approach and the Risk Score-Based approach. Both approaches have the 
same definition of risk as probability multiplied by consequences; however the 
main difference between the two is how consequence is measured. In the WLC 
approach, the consequence is to be defined in absolute values (in monetary 
units) whereas in the Risk Score-Based approach, the consequence is defined by 
a scoring system. 
II.2.4. Water Main Failure Risk 
This section provides an overview of the researches and various efforts related to water 
main failure risk. In their efforts to assess the risk or the probability of pipeline failure, 
researchers have used a broad variety of techniques. Some of the techniques are: fuzzy 
logic (Marshall et al. 2005; Kleiner et al. 2006; Rajani et al. 2006), hierarchical 
holographic modeling (Ezell et al. 2000), first order reliability modeling using Monte 
Carlo Simulation (Sadiq et al. 2004), the analytical hierarchy process (Bandyopadhyay et 
al. 1997; Al Barqawi, 2006), statistical non-homogeneous Poisson modes (Moglia et al. 
2006; Rogers, 2006), fault tree analysis (Yuhua and Datao, 2005), probability density 
function (Souza and Chagas, 2001), artificial neural networks (Christodoulou et al. 2003; 
Al Barqawi, 2006), the non-homogenous Markov process (Kleiner et al. 2004), multi-
criteria decision making (Yan and Vairavamoorthy, 2003), and the Bayesian belief 
network expert system (Hahn et al. 2002). These efforts are thoroughly explained in the 
following paragraphs. 
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Marshall et al. (2005) evaluated the risk of failure of large diameter pre-stressed 
concrete cylinder pipelines. A simplified strength model was developed to 
evaluate the remaining strength of pre-stressed concrete pipe as it ages. This 
model is derived from a process of inspecting pipelines using direct observations 
and non-destructive tests. Many parameters are included in the fuzzy risk model, 
such as: parameters affecting the rate of deterioration, parameters affecting 
repair time, and the consequences of failure. 
Kleiner et al. (2006) developed a methodology to evaluate pipeline failure risk 
using the fuzzy logic technique. The model consists of three parts: possibility of 
failure, consequence of failure and a combination of these two to obtain failure 
risk. In the possibility of failure part, a seven-grade fuzzy set is used to describe 
the asset condition rating and a nine-grade possibility of failure is used to reflect 
the possibility of failure. The failure condition rating is fuzzified (remapped) on 
the nine-grade possibility of failure. In the consequences of failure part, the 
severity of an asset failure consequence is described in a nine-severity grade. 
The consequences of failure can be in the form of direct cost, indirect cost, and 
social cost. The risk of failure is assessed by combining the probability of failure 
with the consequences of failure in nine fuzzy triangular subsets. 
Rajani et al. (2006) used a fuzzy synthetic evaluation technique to translate 
observations from visual inspection and non-destructive tests into water main 
condition ratings. The process involves three steps, (1) fuzzijication of raw data 
(measurements of the distress indicators), (2) aggregation of distress indicators 
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towards the condition rating, and (3) defuzzification that adjusts the condition 
rating to a practical crisp format. 
Ezell et al. (2000) introduced the Probabilistic Infrastructure Risk Analysis 
model (IRAM). This system is developed for small community water supply and 
treatment systems. It consists of four phases. In phase 1, the infrastructure 
failure threats are identified by means of system decomposing. The target of 
phase 2 is to provide information that describes the state of consequences for a 
scenario executed against the system under study. An event tree is used together 
with expert opinion to determine the failure probability of each path in the tree 
and the inherent consequence. In phase 3, the consequence and the probability 
of failure are combined together to identify the high risk factors, which are used 
to manage the infrastructure in phase 4 by setting the acceptance risk level. 
Sadiq et al. (2004) developed a method for evaluating the time-dependent 
reliability of underground grey cast iron water mains, and for identifying the 
major factors that contribute to water main failures. The first-order reliability 
method is used, which employs a Monte Carlo simulation. In a Monte Carlo 
simulation, a set of random values is generated for each input parameter of the 
model (assumed to be independent), in accordance with a predefined probability 
density function. However, the consequence of failure, which is a part of risk 
calculation, is ignored and here the term "risk" refers solely to the probability of 
failure. A sensitivity analysis showed that two of the parameters of the corrosion 
model (the scaling constant for pitting depth and the corrosion rate inhibition 
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factor) were the largest contributors to the variability in the pipe's time to 
failure. 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (1997) established a cost-effective maintenance program 
for a petroleum pipeline through risk analysis. The Analytical Hierarchy Process 
(AHP) is used to carry out the risk assessment. The methodology followed in 
this study starts with risk factors identification which can be listed as: corrosion, 
external interference, acts of god, construction and materials defects, and other 
reasons such as human error, operational error and equipment malfunction. The 
second step is to formulate the risk structure model using AHP, which 
determines the relative severity and probability of each risk factor. Then, 
maintenance/inspection strategy requirements are determined in order to 
mitigate the risk. Cost of failure is classified into four categories according to 
the intensity and is estimated using the Monte Carlo simulation. A cost/benefit 
analysis is carried out at the end to justify an investment proposal. 
Moglia et al. (2006) explained the uses of the Decision Support System 
PARMS-PLANNING which was developed to support the long term assessment 
of costs and the implications of different management and operational asset 
management strategies. Risks associated with different scenarios are assessed 
using a standard risk management approach where risk is calculated by 
combining the output of failure prediction models with the output of cost 
assessment models. The failure prediction models use both a statistical Non-
Homogeneous Poisson model and a physical/probabilistic model that provide 
failure rates and failure probabilities for each year into the future. The cost 
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model is based on user input. The specific costs are classified into: pipeline 
renewal, valve insertions, pipe repairs, supply interruptions, and failure 
consequences. In the risk calculation model, a risk-based approach is based on 
the calculation of risk for different actions and scenarios where risk refers to an 
uncertain event with unwanted consequences. This risk is calculated as the 
statistical expectation of future costs caused by failure. 
Yuhua and Datao (2005) analyzed the failure risk of oil and gas pipelines using fault tree 
analysis. They divided the causes of failure of gas and oil pipelines into 44 failure causes, 
which are categorized using fault tree analysis (FTA). The steps to be followed using 
FTA are: 1) Select experts to form evaluation committee, 2) Convert linguistic terms to 
fuzzy numbers, 3) Convert fuzzy numbers into fuzzy possibilities, and 4) Transform 
fuzzy possibility scores into fuzzy failure probability (FFP). This method uses expert 
opinion to evaluate the possibility of each event causing a failure. Next, the possibility of 
failure is converted into a fuzzy possibility score and then into the fuzzy possibility of 
failure. It is worth to note that the methodology explained above calculates the possibility 
of failure for oil and gas pipelines due to each failure-causing event and does not consider 
the actual condition of the pipeline in service. 
Souza and Chagas (2001) applied the probability theory to evaluate and quantify 
the risk associated with water pollution. This involves identifying risk sources, 
failure probability, and the consequences of failure. The probability theory is 
useful for a system with a consistent set of data. However, for systems without a 
consistent set of data, the possibility of good results will be limited, because the 
probability density function for all the sets of random variables is required in 
P a g e | 20 
this probability theory in order to measure the risk of any environmental system. 
Fuzzy Set Theory could be a better means to determine this sort of risk when 
only inconsistent data sets are available. 
Christodoulou et al. (2003) used Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) to analyze 
the preliminary water main failure risk in an urban area with historical break 
data spanning two decades. The type of ANN used in this study is the 
backpropagation algorithm. The outputs of backpropagation ANN are the age to 
failure of each pipe segment, the observation outcome (a break or a non-break), 
and the relevant weights of the risk factors. Their study indicates that the 
number of previous breaks, the material, diameter, and length of pipe segments 
are the most important risk factors for water main failures. 
Al Barqawi (2006) designed two condition rating models for water mains using artificial 
neural networks (ANN) and the analytical hierarchy process (AHP). In his research, he 
considered only the deterioration factors (physical, operational, and environmental). 
Using the ANN model, he concluded that the most important factors are breakage rate 
and pipe age. However, when using an integrated ANN/AHP model, pipe age, pipe 
material, and breakage rate are the most effective factors in evaluating the current 
condition of water mains. He proposed a condition rating scale from 0 to 10 divided into 
6 regions which describe the status of the water main. 
Kleiner et al. (2004) used a fuzzy rule-based, non-homogeneous Markov process 
to model the deterioration process of buried pipes. The deterioration rate at a 
specific time is estimated based on the asset's age and condition state using a 
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fuzzy rule-based algorithm. Then, the possibility of failure is estimated for any 
age of the pipeline based on the deterioration model. The possibility of failure is 
coupled with the failure consequence through a matrix approach to obtain the 
failure risk as a function of the pipe's age. 
Rogers (2006) developed a model to assess water main failure risk. He used the 
Power Law form of a Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP) and Multi-
Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) based on the Weighted Average Method 
(WAM) to calculate the probability of failure. Moreover, the developed model 
considers the consequence of failure using "what-if infrastructure investment 
scenarios. The probability of failure and the consequences are directly related by 
a multiplication operation in order to determine the associated risk. 
Yan and Vairavamoorthy (2003) proposed a methodology to assess pipeline 
condition using Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) techniques which 
combine the available pipe condition indicators into one single indicator. Both 
fuzzy set theory and its arithmetic corollaries are incorporated in the Composite 
Programming to form Fuzzy Composite Programming (FCP). The model starts 
by converting the linguistic variables into fuzzy numbers. These factors are 
normalized to allow them to be combined and aggregated after assigning 
weights to the different indicators. The output of the model is a fuzzy number 
that reflects the condition of each pipeline, which is ranked accordingly. 
Hahn (2002) developed a knowledge-based expert system to predict the criticality of 
sewer pipelines. The expert system considers information about the environment and the 
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state of a sewer line through an extensive set of relationships that describe failure impact 
mechanisms. The author used a Bayesian belief network to develop the expert system 
denoted as SCRAPS "Sewer Cataloging, Retrieval and Prioritization System". Six failure 
mechanisms that contribute to the likelihood of failure, and two consequences 
mechanisms that contribute to the consequences of failure are included in the model. The 
developed model was evaluated through three approaches: the consequence of failure, the 
likelihood of failure, and both the consequence and the likelihood of failure. The output 
of the model is the pipe line criticality or risk of failure and is categorized into three 
ranges and groups (high, moderate, and low). 
There are other research efforts that were undertaken in disciplines other than 
water/sewer main pipelines such as reactor pipelines (Vinod et al. 2003), 
petroleum pipelines (Bandyopadhyay et al. 1997; Yuhua and Datao, 2005), and 
pipes transferring hydrogen sulfide (Santosh et al. 2006). These efforts are 
explained in the following paragraphs. 
Vinod et al. (2003) developed a study aiming at finding the realistic failure 
frequency of pipe segments based on the degradation mechanisms to be 
employed in Risk Informed In-Service Inspection in Pressurized Heavy Water 
Reactor (PHWR) pipes. The primary PHWR piping is made of carbon steel 
operating at around 300 °C. The model starts with erosion-corrosion rate 
calculation and then applies this rate to the First Order Reliability Method to 
determine the piping failure probability. After that, a Markov model is 
developed to estimate the realistic failure probability, incorporating the effects 
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of In-Service Inspection which yields the failure probability to be used in Risk-
Informed In-Service Inspection. 
Santosh et al. (2006) performed a study to utilize failure probability in a risk-
based inspection of pipelines transferring hydrogen sulphide. This involves 
categorizing these pipelines based on their orders of failure probabilities. Two 
steps are followed in this study: 1) estimation of the remaining strength of a 
pipeline, and 2) evaluating the limit state function of a pipeline that defines the 
failure criteria 
II.3. Risk Evaluation Process and Modeling Approaches 
II.3.1. Risk Process 
There are five steps in a risk process: 1) Risk modeling, 2) Data collection and 
preparation, 3) Segmentation, 4) Assessing risks, and 5) Managing risks 
(Muhlbauer, 2004). 
1) Risk modeling: a pipeline risk assessment model is a set of algorithms 
or rules that use available information and data relationships to 
measure levels of risk along a pipeline. 
2) Data collection and preparation: the collection of all the required 
information about the pipeline, including inspection data, original 
construction information, environmental conditions, operating and 
maintenance history, past failures, and so on. It results in data sets that 
are ready to be used directly by the risk assessment model. 
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3) Segmentation: the process of dividing the pipeline into segments with 
constant risk characteristics, or into measurable pieces. This is required 
because the risk is rarely constant along a pipeline's length. 
4) Assessing risks: the available risk model is applied to the data set in 
order to evaluate the risk associated with each pipeline segment. 
5) Managing risks: this step comprises the decision support process and 
provides the tools needed to best optimize the allocation of resources. 
It is worth mentioning that sometimes risk modeling and data collection is done 
in the reverse order of this process (Muhlbauer, 2004). 
H.3.2. Risk modeling 
There are two types of risk assessment approaches ~ either quantitative or 
qualitative. In a quantitative approach, the quantification of the probability and 
severity of a particular hazardous event can be assessed and the risk is calculated 
as the product: risk = probability x severity. The quantitative risk assessment 
approach includes many methods such as Bayesian inference, fault tree analysis, 
Monte Carlo analysis, and fuzzy arithmetic as a semi-quantitative method. In a 
qualitative approach, the probability of an event may not be known, or not 
agreed upon, or even not recognized as hazardous. Qualitative risk assessment 
includes many methods such as Preliminary Risk/Hazard analysis (PHA), 
Failure Mode and Effects analysis (FMEA), Fuzzy Theory, etc. (Kirchhoff and 
Doberstein, 2006; Lee M. , 2006). 
Generally, there are three types of risk models. They are matrix, probabilistic, 
and indexing models (Muhlbauer, 2004). 
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i. Matrix models 
Matrix models are one of the simplest risk assessment structures. This model 
ranks pipeline risks according to the likelihood and the potential consequences 
of an event by a very simple scale or a numerical scale (low to high or 1 to 5). 
Expert opinion or a more complicated application might be used in this approach 
to rank risks associated with pipelines. A simple risk matrix example is shown in 
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Figure II.2 - Simple risk matrix (Muhlbauer, 2004). 
I'I. Probabilistic models 
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), sometimes called Quantitative Risk 
Assessment (QRS) or Numerical Risk Assessment (NRA), is the most complex 
and rigorous risk model. It is a rigorous mathematical and statistical technique 
that relies heavily on historical failure data and event-tree/fault-tree analysis. 
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This technique is very data intensive. The result of the model is the absolute risk 
assessments of all possible failure events (Muhlbauer, 2004). 
ill. Indexing models 
Indexing models and similar scoring models are the most popular risk 
assessment techniques. In this technique, scores are assigned to important 
conditions and activities on the pipeline system that contribute to the risk, and 
weightings are assigned to each risk variable. The relative weight reflects the 
importance of the item in the risk assessment and is based on statistics where 
available or on engineering judgment (Muhlbauer, 2004). 
II.4. Fuzzy Logic 
II.4.1. Introduction to Fuzzy Logic 
Lotfi Zadeh developed fuzzy logic in the mid-1960s to solve the problem of representing 
approximate knowledge that cannot be represented by conventional, crisp methods. A 
fuzzy set is represented by a membership function. Any "element" value in the universe 
of enclosure of the fuzzy set will have a grade of membership which gives the degree to 
which the particular element belongs to the set (Karray and de Silva, 2004). Fuzzy theory 
relies on four main concepts: (I) fuzzy sets: sets with non-crisp, overlapping boundaries; 
(2) linguistic variables: variables whose values are both qualitatively and quantitatively 
described with fuzzy sets; (3) possibility distributions: constraints on the value of a 
linguistic variable imposed by assigning it a fuzzy set; and (4) fuzzy if-then rules: a 
knowledge representation scheme for describing a functional mapping or a logic formula 
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that generalizes two-valued logic (Del Campo, 2004). More information is included in 
"Appendix A: Introduction to Fuzzy Expert System". 
II.4.2. Fuzzy Logic Application 
Fuzzy logic has been used in many areas in water resources. Bogardi and 
Duckstein (2002) listed some of them as follows: 
• Fuzzy Regression: used where a casual relationship exits with few data 
points. 
• Hydrologic forecasting: Kalman filtering and fuzzy logic are used for 
short-term and medium term forecasting. 
• Hydrologic modeling: where traditional rainfall runoff models can be 
replaced by fuzzy-rule systems with similar performance. 
• Fuzzy-set geostatistics: can be used where imprecise and indirect 
measurements and small data sets are combined in spatial statistical 
analysis. 
• Incorporation of spatial variability into groundwater flow and transport 
modeling with fuzzy logic. 
• Regional water resources management: when selecting among many 
alternative management schemes under small data sets and with 
imprecisely known or modeled objectives. 
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• Multi-criterion decision-making under uncertainty: can be used when 
there are multiple and conflicting criteria and when the criteria 
corresponding to alternative systems are imprecisely known. 
• Fuzzy rule-based modeling: used in the classification of spatial 
hydrometeorological events, climate modeling of flooding, modeling of 
groundwater flow and transport, forecasting pollutants' transport in 
surface water. 
• Reservoir operation planning: applies fuzzy logic to derive operation 
rules. 
• Fuzzy risk analysis: used in evaluating uncertainty in any or all elements 
of risk analysis (load, capacity, and consequence). 
Fuzzy-based methods have been increasingly applied to civil and environmental 
engineering problems in recent years, especially when the available information 
(measured data or expert opinion) is vague and too imprecise to justify the use 
of numbers. As a solution, fuzzy logic provides a language with syntax and 
semantics to translate qualitative knowledge into numerical reasoning. Fuzzy 
systems are used where crisp probabilistic models do not exist (Najjaran et ah 
2004). 
II.4.3. Fuzzy Expert Systems 
i. Definition 
Usually, systems that can process knowledge are called knowledge-based systems. One 
of the most popular and successful knowledge-based systems is the expert system (Jin, 
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2003). Fuzzy logic can be used as a tool to deal with imprecision and the qualitative 
aspects that are associated with problem solving and in the development of expert 
systems. Fuzzy expert systems use the knowledge of humans, which is qualitative and 
inexact. In many cases, decisions are to be taken even if the experts may be only partially 
knowledgeable about the problem domain, or data may not be fully available. The 
reasons behind using fuzzy logic in expert systems may be summarized as follows 
(Karray and de Silva, 2004): 
• The knowledge base of expert systems summarizes the human experts' 
knowledge and experience. 
• Fuzzy descriptors (e.g., large, small, fast, poor, fine) are commonly used in the 
communication of experts' knowledge, which is often inexact and qualitative. 
• Problem description by the user may not be exact. 
• Reasonable decisions must be taken even if the experts' knowledge base may not 
be complete. 
• Educated guesses need to be made in certain situations. 
ii. Fuzzy Expert System Application 
An expert system consists of a knowledge base in the form of rules representing specific 
domains of knowledge, plus a database (Jin, 2003). In this section, the use of expert 
systems in the field of water resources is reviewed. 
Nasiri et al. (2007) proposed a fuzzy multiple-attribute decision support expert system to 
compute the water quality index and to provide an outline for the prioritization of 
alternative plans. 
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Najjaran et al. (2004) developed a fuzzy logic expert system in order to establish a 
criterion for predicting the deterioration of a cast/ductile iron water main using soil 
properties. The fuzzy model determines the relationships between the output and inputs 
of a system using antecedent and consequent propositions in a set of IF-THEN rules. The 
input variables used in this model are selected from soil properties. The output is 
corrosivity potential. The developed fuzzy model is imprecise for a certain range of 
corrosivity potential either because the number of fuzzy rules in the rule base is 
insufficient or the input and output partitions are not appropriately tuned in some range of 
their universe of discourse. 
ill'. Hierarchical fuzzy expert system 
Acquiring knowledge for fuzzy rule-based systems can be achieved from human experts 
or from experimental data using several methods (see A.8.2. Fuzzy Knowledge Rules 
Acquisition). Mainly, there are three different approaches (Jin, 2003): 
• Indirect Knowledge Acquisition 
• Direct Knowledge Acquisition 
• Automatic Knowledge Acquisition 
Reducing the total number of rules and their corresponding computation requirements is 
one of the most important issues in subjective fuzzy logic systems where the knowledge 
base rules are solicited from experts in contract to the objective fuzzy systems where the 
knowledge base rules are extracted from data. The "Curse of dimensionality" is an 
attribute of subjective fuzzy systems since the number of rules and thus the complexity 
increases exponentially with the number of variables involved in the model. To minimize 
this problem, the hierarchical fuzzy system is proposed, where the overall system is 
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divided into a number of low-dimensional fuzzy systems. This has the advantage that the 
total number of rules increases linearly with the number of the input variables. The 
number of rules is greatly reduced by using a hierarchical fuzzy system (Lee et al. 2003). 
There are several approaches to deal with hierarchical structures. One is that the output of 
the last layer as a crisp value can be used as the input of the next layer in the hierarchical 
fuzzy system. The advantage of this approach is that it will reduce the uncertainty of the 
new result by reducing the number of fired rules in the new layer, but at the expense of 
the information of uncertainty that is lost. Another approach is to consider the fuzzy 
output of the last layer as the fuzzy input of the next layer. The advantage of this 
approach is that it preserves the information about uncertainty. However, if the fuzzy set 
is too wide, it will trigger too many rules in the new layer resulting in a very uncertain 
result. Another approach is to decompose the defuzzification of the output that is used as 
the input in the new layer into two or more crisp singletons (Gentile, 2004). 
II.4.4. Expert Opinion Acquisition 
Collecting information from experts will often require the use of qualitative 
descriptive terms. Verbal labeling has some advantages, including ease of 
explanation and familiarity. There are many emerging techniques of artificial 
intelligence systems that aim at solving problems involving incomplete 
knowledge and the use of descriptive terms through better use of human 
reasoning. Fuzzy logic as an artificial intelligence system makes use of natural 
language in risk modeling (Muhlbauer, 2004). 
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Expert opinions can be acquired with several methods; some of which are 
(Cooke and Goossens, 2004): 
1. Point Values: This method is used in the earlier expert systems like the 
Delphi method where experts are asked to guess the values of unknown 
quantities as a form of single point estimates. However, it has many 
disadvantages which restrict the use of this method such as: scale 
dependency, no indication of uncertainty in the assessments, and the 
methodology of processing and combining the experts' judgment as 
physical measurements. 
2. Paired Comparisons: Experts are asked to rank alternatives pair-wise 
according to certain criteria. Some of the disadvantages of this method 
are: redundancy of the judgment data and no assessment of uncertainty. 
3. Discrete Event Probabilities: Experts are asked to assess the probability of 
occurrence of uncertain events as a point in the [0, 1] interval. 
Disadvantages of this method are: careless formulations can easily 
introduce confusion, and large finite populations are needed to adequately 
measure the variable. 
4. Distributions of Continuous Uncertain Quantities: Experts may be asked 
to give a unique real value and to give a subjective probability 
distribution. The probability distribution can be in the form of a 
cumulative distribution function, density or mass function, or other 
information such as the mean and standard deviation. 
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5. Conditionalisation and Dependence: Relevant variables must be specified 
in the background information and the failure to specify background 
information can lead experts to conditionalise their uncertainties in 
different ways, which can introduce "noise" into the assessment process. 
Variables whose values are not specified in the background information 
can produce dependencies in the uncertainties of target variables. Experts 
should be asked to address the dependencies in their subjective 
distributions for these variables. 
II.5. Risk and Condition Rating Scale 
The risk of failure scale derives its importance from the need for a common language to 
be spoken among the different authorities and municipalities. It is also used to compare 
the condition and status of the infrastructure through a standardization process and to 
allow decision makers to make informed decisions about the needs of an infrastructure to 
be maintained or rehabilitated. Moreover, one of the important benefits of the failure risk 
scale is to track the deterioration process of an asset over time. Developing a failure risk 
scale usually depends on experts' opinions and experience or on the common practice 
followed in managing the asset. 
II.5.1. Different Types of Scales 
Any risk scale consists mainly of three parts: numerical scale, linguistic scale, and 
sometimes the associated corrective actions or maintenance plan. There are many types of 
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scales. Certain types of scales are more popular and used more in the domain of one 
specific type of asset than others. This is due to standardization efforts and the studies 
made in that domain of assets. For example, a five-point scale is widely used in the 
condition assessment process of underground sewer pipes because it has been adopted by 
many codes of practice in that area. Some of the more commonly used types of scales are 
summarized in Table II.5 (Rahman, 2007). It should be mentioned that this table only 
shows examples and does not include all of the types of scales since it is possible to 
modify almost any scale to fit an organization's needs. 
Table II.5 - Scales types (adapted from Rahman, 2007). 
Scale Type 
2 Point Scale 
3 Point Scale 
4 Point Scale 
5 Point Scale 
6 Point Scale 
10 Point Scale 









1 -5 scale 
0-5 scale 
1-10 rating; 0-9 rating 
0-10 rating 
Al Barqawi (2006) developed a condition rating scale for underground pipelines. The 
scale is divided into 6 categories ranging numerically form 0 to 10 and linguistically from 
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"critical to excellent" as shown in Figure II.3. He extracted this scale from experts' 
opinions via a questionnaire. 
0 3 4 6 8W 9 10 
Very 
Critic Poor Moderate Good Good Excellent 
Figure II.3 - Underground pipelines condition rating scale. 
Similar to Al Barqawi (2006), Rahman (2007) proposed a scale from 0 to 10 divided into 
six condition grades (Figure II.4). The purpose of this scale is to fit the results of a 
condition assessment of different elements of a drinking water treatment plant. 
I R»3 i l l l f $ 3 
0 3 4 6 8 „ 9 10 
Very 
Critic Poor Moderate Good Good Excellent 
Figure 11.4 - Drinking water treatment plant condition rating scale. 
Chughtai (2007) used a scale for sewer pipeline condition assessment which consists only 
of integers and does not allow for intervals, as shown in Figure II.5. The reasoning 
behind this is that the results of the condition assessment model are only integers and thus 
there is no need for an interval scale. 
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Light Medium Severe 
Figure II.5 - Sewer pipeline condition assessment scale. 
II.6. Summary 
This chapter reviewed many topics that give an overview on how to approach the stated 
problem. The topics included are: water main classification, risk of water main failure, 
the risk evaluation process and modeling approaches, and fuzzy logic. 
From the literature review, it is clear that the works that have addressed the problem of 
water main failure risk have certain limitations, and therefore research that addresses the 
problem with a broad, concrete, and robust approach is still needed. Certain researchers 
have approached the problem in too shallow fashion, considering very few risk factors 
which sometimes were limited to only the deterioration factors (condition rating) and/or 
they did not consider the consequence of failure. Moreover, some of these researches 
were so complicated in their derivation and usage that different municipalities and 
authorities management teams are reluctant to use and depend on them. Other efforts 
were too specific to certain conditions (such as pipe material, diameter, function, e tc . . ) 
and thus are not applicable to different water distribution networks. Some examples of 
these researches were done by: Christodoulou et al. (2003), Yan and Vairavamoorthy 
(2003), Kleiner et al. (2004), Sadiq et al. (2004), Kleiner et al. (2006), Rajani et al. 
(2006) and Al Barqawi (2006). The most relevant and solid research was done by Rogers 
(2006); however, there are some limitations inherent to his research such as: the model 
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uses the weighted average method which does not address the uncertainty and the model 
is too sensitive to the weights of the factors. Moreover, Rogers' failure consequence 
model is not well-established and depends solely on the input of the model user. In 
addition, some of the risk factors are derived from a specific data set and seem to be more 
reflective of that data set instead of reflecting the state of the art. 
There are other research works that address the risk of failure of pipelines other than 
water mains. Some of these researches cover areas such as: risk of failure of large 
diameter pre-stressed concrete cylinder pipelines (Marshall et al. 2005), small community 
water supply and treatment systems (Ezell et al. 2000), failure risk of sewers (Hahn, 
2002), pressurized heavy-water reactor pipelines (Vinod et al. 2003), and pipelines 
transferring hydrogen sulphide (Santosh et al. 2006). There have been more efforts to 
address the risk associated with pipelines transferring petroleum materials (oil and gas) 
due to the catastrophic consequence of their failure. Some of these studies are by 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (1997), and Yuhua and Datao (2005). 
Based on this exhaustive literature review, it is clear that there is a need to address the 
problem of water main failure risk using a technique ~ such as fuzzy logic ~ that 
considers the uncertainty usually associated with risk factors. 
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Chapter III: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology consists of eight stages as shown in Figure III. 1. It starts with 
a comprehensive literature review of the risk of water main failure followed by data 
collection, which in itself consists of two parts. A hierarchical fuzzy expert system 
(HFES) is developed using model information data which is then underwent a 
verification process. The next part of the research methodology is to develop a risk of 
failure scale which will guide the network operators to best manage their networks. The 
HFES model is used to assess the case study data collected from two municipalities. The 
developed fuzzy expert application is based on MS ® Excel 2007 software. 
III.l. Literature Review 
All of the subjects related to the risk of water main failure are reviewed in order to have a 
better overview of the topic, how others approached the problem, and how to best solve 
the stated problem. In this research, the reviewed topics are water main classifications, 
risk definition, different types of failure, different sources of risk associated with water 
main failure, and consequences of failure. Different approaches in evaluation and 
modeling the risk of failure such as matrix models, probabilistic models, and indexing 
models are reviewed. 
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Literature Review 
Study Risk Factors 




Risk of Failure Scale 
Case Studies Applications 
Excel-based Risk of Failure 
Water main classification 
Source of risk 
Risk evaluation & 
modeling 
Fuzzy logic 






Case Study Data Sets 
Data Collection 
Figure III. 1 - Research methodology. 
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Some topics related to fuzzy logic are reviewed and can be listed as: literature review of 
fuzzy logic and related research in the field of municipal networks, fuzzy logic process 
and operation, and fuzzy expert systems. The use of experts' opinions in developing 
fuzzy expert systems and hierarchy applications topics are reviewed as well. At last, 
different scales used in the field of failure risk and condition assessment are reviewed. 
III.2. Data Collection 
The data collected for this research are used to develop the model and to apply the HFES 
to case studies. The data needed to develop the model is collected from the literature and 
by a questionnaire which is sent to experts in the field of water main infrastructure 
management as shown in (Appendix B). Data for case studies are collected from two 
municipalities that operate water mains. Three case studies data sets are introduced. The 
first is the data set collected from the City of Moncton, New Brunswick. It contains data 
for only seven out of the sixteen factors considered in this research; mainly the 
quantitative factors. The second data set is constructed out of the first data set. Since the 
first data set has some unavailable information about many risk factors (qualitative in 
nature and do not require exact measurements or calculations), the second data set is 
completed by randomly assuming the unavailable factors. The third data set is collected 
from the City of London, Ontario. It contains data about nine failure risk factors. 
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III.3. Hierarchical Fuzzy Expert System for Water Main Failure Risk 
A hierarchical fuzzy expert system (HFES) is developed to estimate the risk of 
water main failure. A Mamdani's fuzzy rules system is used as implication 
operation in the fuzzy model. The hierarchical fuzzy model consists of four main 
models which correspond to the four main factors: Environmental, Physical, 
Operational, and Post-failure models. The results of these four models as crisp 
values are used as crisp observations (input) to the fifth model which calculated 
the risk of failure of water mains. Each of these branches has its own sub-factors 
as shown in the hierarchy in Figure III.2. 
In this research, in order to build the model knowledge base, the indirect 
knowledge acquisition method (by means of a questionnaire and the available 
literature) is used to gather the required information. However, a methodology is 
proposed that is different from the traditional rules-building methodology, as 
explained in detail in Section IV. 1.3. Expert knowledge base. 
The first step in processing the data in the model is the fuzzification process. 
This step uses the factors' membership functions to convert the real number into 
a fuzzy number of a value in the period [0, 1]. In order to do this, each 
membership function (linguistic variable) can be represented in an equation as 
shown in Equation III. 1 (Del Campo, 2004), which converts the input number as 
a real number (x) into a fuzzy number. 
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x < a 
a<x<b 
b < x < c 
c < x < d 
x > d 
Equation IH.l 














Hydraulic Factor j 




Loss of Production 
— Traffic Disruption 
Type of Serviced 
Area 
Figure III.2 — Hierarchical risk factors of water main failure. 
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After converting the real numbers of all the factors into fuzzy numbers, each of 
the knowledge base rules is evaluated. The general form of the knowledge base 
rules is as follows (Jin, 2003): 
/?-': / / xx is AJt and x2 is AJ2 and x3 is A3 and ...xn is AJn THEN y is Bj 
Where Rj is the j-th rule, A{ (j = 1,2,... N,i = 1,2, ...n),B ; are the fuzzy 
subsets of the inputs and outputs respectively. 
This rule can be written mathematically as Equation III.2 (Jin, 2003): 
r \ A A A * Equation III.2 
VRi (X1,X2,X3, ..., xn, y) = nAj A pAj A A^/ - A / / , ; A MB 
Where A denotes the minimum operator. 
The consequent linguistic variable ff is to be chosen from a standard list of 
seven linguistic variables (Extremely low, Very low, Moderately Low, Medium, 
Moderately High, Very High, and Extremely High). 
After evaluating each rule in the knowledge base, the membership value of each 
consequent function (output linguistic variable) is aggregated using a maximum operation 
as shown in Equation III.3 (Jin, 2003). In other words, the maximum membership value 
of the ff consequent variable is used to truncate that consequent membership function for 
later use in the defuzzification of the fuzzy output. 
N 
liR(x1,X2,X3,...,Xn,y) = \j[[iRj(x1,X2,X3,...,Xn,y)] Equation II1.3 
/ = ! 
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Where V denotes the maximum operation, R represents each of the consequent 
membership functions as standardized to the list of (Extremely low, Very low, 
Moderately Low, Medium, Moderately High, Very High, and Extremely High). 
The next step is to defuzzify the consequent membership functions into one 
crisp number. The defuzzification method used is the Center of Sum. It 
calculates the center of gravity of each function individually and then average-
weights them by their areas. It has the advantage of being simple to program, 
requiring minimal computer resources, and it gives reasonable results. The crisp 
output of risk can be found using Equation III.4. 
Crisp Risk Output = 
extremely high . extremely high 
y (Truncated Arean x Centeriodn) I y 
n=extremely low ' n=extreme 
Truncated Areav 
^ tr l  I n=extremely low 
Equation III.4 
The procedure described above is generic and is applicable to every branch 
(model) of the hierarchy (environmental, physical, operational, post-failure 
factors branches (models), and risk of failure model which combines the four 
models) to generate crisp output. Figure III.3 shows the data processing flow in 
the physical risk model. The data processing flow of other factors' models are 
identical to the physical factor model (only the sub-factors, their associated 
membership functions (linguistic variables), and knowledge rules are different). 
These crisp numbers are used as input to the risk of failure model and processed 
as explained above. Figure III.4 shows the data processing in the Risk of Failure 
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model. It starts with the risk input from the four main models (branches of the 
hierarchy) and then the model converts them into fuzzy numbers which then are 
evaluated using the fuzzy knowledge base rules. The triggered fuzzy rules are 
aggregated and defuzzified into a crisp number which represents the Risk of 




















IF pipe diameter is a AND pipe material is b AND pipe age 
is c AND protection method is d THEN physical risk is e. 
Crisp input to the next level of the hierarchy (Risk of failure model) 
Figure III .3 - Physical risk model structure. 
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Figure I1I.4 - Risk of failure model structure. 
III.4. Model Analysis and Verification 
A sensitivity analysis is carried out in order to test the sensitivity of the model 
and its stability, and to insure that it is performing as expected. The sensitivity 
analysis is done by assuming many scenarios; testing most weighted factors, 
testing, the effect of weights on the model, testing the model performance from 
the least risky to highest risky status of the factors, etc.... Model verification is 
carried out by using a validated model to compare the results of the proposed 
model with the validated model. The model used for verification is the AHP 
deterioration model developed by Al Barqawi (2006) which can only evaluate 
the deterioration part of the proposed model. 
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111.5. Risk of Failure Scale 
In light of the reviewed literature, a risk of failure scale is proposed to help decision 
makers in water resources management companies/municipalities make an informed 
decision. The scale ranges numerically from 0 to 10, where 10 indicates the most risky 
condition of the pipeline and 0 indicates the least risky condition. Linguistically, the scale 
is divided into five groups or regions which describe the risk of pipeline failure and the 
required corrective actions to be taken if needed, as explained later in Section "V.8. 
Proposed Risk of Failure Scale". The number of proposed groups and their ranges and 
associated corrective actions are likely to be changed to best suit municipality's strategies 
and risk tolerance. 
111.6. Case Studies Application 
Three case studies data sets are collected and used to show the application of the 
developed model. The case studies results are studied and analyzed and some 
recommendations are proposed depending on the results of the model. In case study one, 
the results show that the condition of the network is fair (66% of the network) with some 
parts of the network requiring mitigation action in the short-term plan. However, the 
results of case study two show that the condition of the network is risky (50%) to fair 
(47%) with some parts of the network requiring immediate mitigation action. In case 
study three, the condition of the network is fair (50%) to risky (45%) with some parts of 
the network require immediate mitigation action. 
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111.7. Excel-Based Application Development 
An application is built to implement the developed model. The application is 
based on MS© Excel 2007. The application consists of many spreadsheet files. 
It is controlled through an Excel file called "Navigation". This file contains all 
the step by step instructions that will guide the user to the easy use of the 
application. Other spreadsheet files represent the four branches of the hierarchy, 
the risk of failure model, etc... A full review of the application is explained in 
"Chapter VI: Excel-Based Application Development". 
111.8. Summary 
This chapter presented the research methodology followed in this thesis. This 
methodology includes the literature review of the risk of water main failure, data 
collection (which consists of model information data and case studies data) HFES model 
development, the risk of failure scale, case studies evaluation, and the development of an 
Excel-based application. 
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Chapter IV: DATA COLLECTION 
The data collection consists of two stages which are required to develop and run the fuzzy 
expert system. In stage one, the information needed to build the model is collected. In 
stage two, real network characteristics are gathered and analyzed by the developed 
model. The process of data collection and its parts is shown in Figure IV. 1. 










Figure IV. 1 - Water main data collection process. 
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IV.l. Model Information 
The information needed to develop the model consists of two parts: factors' weights and 
factors' performance impact. The majority of information is gathered from the literature. 
The information that can not be collected from the literature is collected via a 
questionnaire. A sample questionnaire is shown in Appendix B. The two parts of the 
model information are as follows: 
IV.1.1. Weights of Factors 
In this section, the relative weight of each factor at each level of the hierarchy is 
collected. This could be the answer to the question of "What is the strength of the factor 
in contributing to the failure event?" This information is collected by a questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was sent to fifty-eight experts (designers, operators, consultants, 
researchers), and feedback was received from only twenty, giving an average response of 
34% as shown in Figure 1V.2. 
Figure IV.2 - Questionnaire statistics. 
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Geographically, the received responses can be summarized according to their locations as 
follows: Quebec 4 responses, Alberta 6, Ontario 6, British Colombia 2, New Brunswick 
1, and Saskatchewan 1 response. Figure IV.3 shows the percentages of received 
responses from each participating province. 
H 
- • » & * • : + . - . ; • . • • . « * • ' * • 





Figure IV.3 - Percentages of received questionnaires from each Canadian province. 
Table IV.1 shows the collected factors' weights. The local weight of each risk sub-factor 
shown in that column is comparable only to its group of risk factor (hierarchy branch). 
The weights of the sub-factors can be compared to those in other groups by multiplying 
the sub-factors' local weights by the main factor weight of where they belong, as shown 
in the Global Weights column. It is worth mentioning that the developed model can use 
either the local or global weights since each main risk factor is treated and modeled 
separately. It is obvious that pipe age has the highest weight and thus it has the most 
effect on the model. Figure IV.4 shows a graph of the normalized global weights of the 
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failure risk factors. From this graph, it can be deduced that pipe age has the highest effect 
among the other factors, followed by pipe material and breakage rate. By reviewing the 
values of standard deviation, the highest value is 20, the lowest is 4, and the average is 
10, which are acceptable values. 
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Figure IV.4 - Risk factors normalized global weights. 
IV.1.2. Factors Performance Impact 
In this section, performance assessment of the different factors considered in this project 
(as shown in Figure III.2) is collected mainly from the literature. The information about 
the factors where the performance is not clear or is missing is collected via a 
questionnaire. The performance or behavior of 13 out of 16 factors are collected from the 
literature review: soil type, daily traffic, pipe diameter, pipe material, pipe age, protection 
method, breakage rate, hydraulic factor, water quality, leakage rate, cost of repair, traffic 
disruption, and type of serviced area. The remaining required information is collected in 
the form of a questionnaire sent to experts in order to gather their opinion and experience 
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about the behavior and characteristic of the water main network. The performance impact 
of only three factors are collected via the questionnaire: water table level, damage to 
surroundings/business disruption, and loss of production. This information is gathered in 
the form of (if-then) or (cause-effect) where the answer is standardized to the following 
list: "Extremely High, Very High, Moderately High, Medium, Moderately Low, Very Low, 
Extremely Low" 
The factors' performance impact is shown below: 
/. Environmental Factors 
The environmental factors are type of soil, water table level, and average daily traffic. 
The performance of the type of soil and average daily traffic factors are collected from 
the literature and are shown in Table IV.2 and Table 1V.4 respectively. Water table level 
factor performance is collected by a questionnaire and shown in Table IV.3. 
Table IV.2 - Type of soil factor performance. 
Factor performance 
if soil is Very lightly deteriorative 
if soil is Lightly deteriorative 
if soil is Moderately deteriorative 
if soil is Highly deteriorative 
if soil is Very highly deteriorative 
Impact on risk 
then the risk of failure is Extremely Low 
then the risk of failure is Very Low 
then the risk of failure is Medium 
then the risk of failure is Very High 
then the risk of failure is Extremely High 
Table IV.3 - Water table level factor performance. 
Factor performance 
if WT is rarely present 
ifWTis seasonally present 
if WT is always present 
Impact on risk 
then the risk of failure is Extremely Low 
then the risk of failure is Extremely High 
then the risk of failure is Moderately High 
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Table IV.4 - Daily traffic factor performance. 
Factor performance 
if ADT is Very light 
ifADTis Light 
if ADT is Moderate 
ifADTis Heavy 
if ADT is Very heavy 
Impact on risk 
then the risk of failure is Extremely Low 
then the risk of failure is Very Low 
then the risk of failure is Medium 
then the risk of failure is Very High 
then the risk of failure is Extremely High 
I'I. Physical Factors 
This category of factors includes pipe diameter, material, age, and pipe 
protection method. The performance of the different factors are shown in Table 
IV.5 through Table IV.8. These factors' performance is collected from the 
literature. 
Table IV.5 - Pipe diameter factor performance. 
Factor performance 
if dia. is small (< 250 mm) 
ifdia. is medium (between 250 to 500) 
Impact on risk 
then the risk of failure is Very High 
then the risk of failure is Very Low 






ifADTis Ductile iron 
ifADTis Steel 
ifADTis Cast iron 
if ADT is Cast iron post war 
Impact on risk 
then the risk of failure is Medium 
then the risk of failure is Moderately High 
then the risk of failure is Very Low 
then the risk of failure is Extremely Low 
then the risk of failure is Very Low 
then the risk of failure is Very Low 
then the risk of failure is Very High 
then the risk of failure is Extremely High 
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Table IV.7 - Pipe age factor performance. 
Factor performance 
if age is new (0 yrs < Age < 10 yrs) 
if age is young (10 yrs < Age < 30 yrs) 
if age is medium (30 < Age < 50) 
if age is old (50 yrs < Age < 70 yrs) 
if age is very old (> 70 yrs) 
Impact on risk 
then the risk of failure is Extremely Low 
then the risk of failure is Very Low 
then the risk of failure is Medium 
then the risk of failure is Very High 
then the risk of failure is Extremely High 
Table IV.8 - Protection methods factor performance. 
Factor performance 
if pipe has Cathodic protection 
if pipe has Lining/Coating 
if pipe has none 
Impact on risk 
then the risk of failure is Very Low 
then the risk of failure is Extremely Low 
then the risk of failure is Medium 
HI. Operational Factors 
Operational factors include breakage rate, hydraulic factor (hazen-william coefficient), 
water quality, and leakage rate. The factors' performance is collected from the literature 
and are shown in Table IV.9 through Table IV. 12. 
Table IV.9 - Breakage rate factor performance. 
Factor performance 
if breakage rate is low (< 0.5 brk/km/yr) 
if breakage rate is average (bet 0.5 and 3) 
if breakage rate is high (> 3 brk/km/yr) 
Impact on risk 
then the risk of failure is Extremely Low 
then the risk of failure is Medium 
then the risk of failure is Extremely High 
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Table IV. 10 - Hydraulic factor performance. 
Factor performance 
if pipe is very rough (C-factor < 40) 
if pipe is rough (60 > C-factor > 40) 
if pipe is medium (80 > C-factor > 60) 
if pipe is smooth (100 > C-factor > 80) 
if pipe is very smooth (C > 100) 
Impact on risk 
then the risk of failure is Extremely High 
then the risk of failure is Very High 
then the risk of failure is Medium 
then the risk of failure is Very Low 
then the risk of failure is Extremely Low 
Table IV. 11 - Water quality factor performance. 
Factor performance 
if WQ is very good 
if WQ is good 
ifWQis acceptable 
ifWQis bad 
if WQ is very bad 
Impact on risk 
then the risk of failure is Extremely Low 
then the risk of failure is Very Low 
then the risk of failure is Medium 
then the risk of failure is Very High 
then the risk of failure is Extremely High 
Table IV. 12 - Leakage rate factor performance. 
Factor performance 
if leakage is very low 
if leakage is low 
if leakage is medium 
if leakage is high 
if leakage is very high 
Impact on risk 
then the risk of failure is Extremely Low 
then the risk of failure is Very Low 
then the risk of failure is Medium 
then the risk of failure is Very High 
then the risk of failure is Extremely High 
iV. Post failure Factors 
This category of factors represents the consequence of failure. It includes five 
factors. The performance of cost of repair, traffic disruption, and type of 
serviced area and are shown in Table IV. 13, Table IV. 16, and Table IV. 17 are 
collected from literature. Damage to surrounding and loss of productions 
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factors' performance is collected by a questionnaire as shown in Table IV. 14 
and Table IV. 15. 
Table IV. 13 - Cost of repair factor performance. 
Factor performance 
if repair cost is very low 
if repair cost is low 
if repair cost is medium 
if repair cost is high 
if repair cost is very high 
Impact on risk 
then the risk of failure is Extremely Low 
then the risk of failure is Very Low 
then the risk of failure is Medium 
then the risk of failure is Very High 
then the risk of failure is Extremely High 
Table IV. 14 - Damage to surroundings factor performance. 
Factor performance 
if failure in Industrial area 
if failure in Commercial area 
if failure in Residential are 
Impact on risk 
then the risk of failure is Extremely High 
then the risk of failure is Moderately High 
then the risk of failure is Extremely Low 
Table IV.15 - Loss of production factor performance. 
Factor performance 
if pipe is small & redundant 
if pipe is medium & redundant 
if pipe is small & not redundant 
if pipe is medium & not redundant 
Impact on risk 
then the risk of failure is Very Low 
then the risk of failure is Moderately Low 
then the risk of failure is Medium 
then the risk of failure is Very High 
Table IV. 16 - Traffic disruption factor performance. 
Factor performance 
if failure is Very lightly disruptive 
if failure is Lightly disruptive 
if failure is Moderately disruptive 
if failure is Highly disruptive 
if failure is Very highly disruptive 
Impact on risk 
then the cost of failure is Extremely Low 
then the cost of failure is Very Low 
then the cost of failure is Medium 
then the cost of failure is Very High 
then the cost of failure is Extremely High 
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Table IV. 17 - Type of serviced area factor performance. 
Factor performance 
if failure stops service to Industrial area 
if failure stops service to Commercial area 
if failure stops service to Residential are 
Impact on risk 
then the cost of failure is Very High 
then the cost of failure is Medium 
then the cost of failure is Moderately Low 
v. Risk of failure Factors 
This contains the four main risk of failure factors as shown in Figure III.2. It 
includes environmental, physical, operational and post failure factors. There 
performance is shown in Table IV. 18 to Table IV.21. 
Table IV. 18 - Environmental factor performance. 
Factor performance 
if environmental risk is Extremely Low 
if environmental risk is Very Low 
if environmental risk is Moderately Low 
if environmental risk is Medium 
if environmental risk is Moderately High 
if environmental risk is Very High 
if environmental risk is Extremely High 
Impact on risk 
then the risk of failure is Extremely Low 
then the risk of failure is Very Low 
then the risk of failure is Moderately Low 
then the risk of failure is Medium 
then the risk of failure is Moderately High 
then the risk of failure is Very High 
then the risk of failure is Extremely High 
Table IV. 19 - Physical factor performance. 
Factor performance 
if physical risk is Extremely Low 
if physical risk is Very Low 
if physical risk is Moderately Low 
if physical risk is Medium 
if physical risk is Moderately High 
if physical risk is Very High 
if physical risk is Extremely High 
Impact on risk 
then the risk of failure is Extremely Low 
then the risk of failure is Very Low 
then the risk of failure is Moderately Low 
then the risk of failure is Medium 
then the risk of failure is Moderately High 
then the risk of failure is Very High 
then the risk of failure is Extremely High 
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Table IV.20 - Operational factor performance. 
Factor performance 
ifoperationalriskis Extremely Low 
ifoperationalriskis Very Low 
if operational risk is Moderately Low 
if operational risk is Medium 
if operational risk is Moderately High 
ifoperationalriskis Very High 
if operational risk is Extremely High 
Impact on risk 
then the risk of failure is Extremely Low 
then the risk of failure is Very Low 
then the risk of failure is Moderately Low 
then the risk of failure is Medium 
then the risk of failure is Moderately High 
then the risk of failure is Very High 
then the risk of failure is Extremely High 
Table IV.21 - Post failure factor performance. 
Factor performance 
if post failure risk is Extremely Low 
if post failure risk is Very Low 
if post failure risk is Moderately Low 
if post failure risk is Medium 
if post failure risk is Moderately High 
if post failure risk is Very High 
if post failure risk is Extremely High 
Impact on risk 
then the risk of failure is Extremely Low 
then the risk of failure is Very Low 
then the risk of failure is Moderately Low 
then the risk of failure is Medium 
then the risk of failure is Moderately High 
then the risk of failure is Very High 
then the risk of failure is Extremely High 
IV.1.3. Expert knowledge base 
The next step is to combine the collected factors' weights and factors 
performance in a form that can be used in an expert system and represents the 
knowledge of the experts. To do so, a rules building methodology will be used 
which uses weighted average method to combine the factors' performance 
depending on the weights. The reason behind using this methodology over the 
traditional methodology of directly soliciting the rules from experts is that the 
traditional methodology requires the expert to evaluate the performance of a 
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huge number of rules; this process is exhausting and time consuming and the 
human expert will most probably not carry out this task. To overcome this major 
drawback to using a traditional methodology in rules extraction, a new 
methodology is proposed. The proposed new methodology will ask the expert to 
evaluate the performance of each factor independent of other factors as collected 
in IV.1.2. Factors Performance Impact (e.g. IF pipe age is old THEN the risk of 
failure is High). Moreover, the expert is also asked to give a weight to each 
factor which reflects the contribution of each factor to the risk of water main 
failure as collected in IV. 1.1. Weights of Factors. The general outlines of the 
proposed method are explained in Figure IV.5. The proposed method shares an 
idea with the method originally developed by Shaheen (2005). The shared idea 
is the use of the impact of each factor individually together with its weight 
(importance) to generate the equivalent impact of the rules. The main difference 
between the proposed method and the one developed by Shaheen (2005) is the 
use of the average weighted method to choose the equivalent impact of the rule 
instead of using a normalization process. Moreover, both the factors' 
performance impact scale and equivalent ranges of impact scale are derived 
from the performance of the model (fuzzy model to be built in the next chapter) 
instead of using two different scales and using a normalization process. Using 
the weights of factors, the combined performance impact of the different factors 
is calculated using the weighted average method. The followings shows the 
steps followed in finding the equivalent impact of different combinations of each 
four branches of the hierarchy and the main level of the hierarchy. 
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Rulex: If Factorx is performance(x) and Factor2 is performance(v) and... and Factorn is performance(z) 
then equivalent combined impact is XXX 1 
In order to find the equivalent combined impact of each rule, it is calculated as follows (example of last 
rule x.v.z): 
. _ W!XF1CX +W2XF2Cv+-+WnxFnCz 
W1+W2+~+W„ 
Equivalent impact • 
Where 
F1CX = performance impact value of factor 1 
F2CV = performance impact value of factor 2 
FnCz = performance impact value of factor n 
These values are 




































After that, the equivalent impact value is matched against the ranges of the scale shown below 
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Figure IV.5 - Proposed methodology for fuzzy rules extraction. 
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i. Environmental Factors 
1) Number of performance combination 
The number of performance combination can be calculated for the 
environmental factors by multiplying the number of performance stages 
of the factors. In this research, the number of different performance 
combinations needed to cover all the combination possibilities can be 
found as: 
number of environmental rules 
= 5 (soil type) 
X 5 (average daily traffic) 
x 3 (water table level) = 75 rules 
Equation IV. 1 
Example: IF Type of soil is moderately deteriorative AND Average daily 
traffic is extremely high AND Water table level is rarely present. 
2) Weights of factors 
This is discussed in section IV.1.1. Weights of Factors. The normalized 
global weights or the local weights can be used in this process as shown 
in Table IV.22. 
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3) Factors performance impacts 
The factors performance impacts at different stages (collected in section 















































Figure IV.6 - Factor performance impact scale 
To illustrate how this scale works, an example is given below: 
• If soil type is moderately deteriorative then risk of failure is medium (5 
impact value) 
• If average daily traffic is very heavy then risk of failure is extremely high 
(9.72 impact value) 
• If water table level is rarely present then the risk of failure is extremely 
low (0.28 impact value) 
4) Factors performance combined impact 
In order to find the combined impact of the different factors' performance, 
weighted average method is used as shown in Equation IV.2. 
Equivalent impact = 
Y.(i™.pcLct x Weight) of each factor 
£ factors Weights 
Equation IV.2 
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This equivalent impact is matched against another scale that is divided 













































Figure IV.7 - Equivalent ranges of combined impact. 
Both impact values scale and impact ranges scale are derived from the 
shape of membership functions of the consequent of the fuzzy system to 
be developed in next chapter. Continuing the example shown above, the 
combined impact is found and the rule is established. So, 
Equivalent impact 
Equation IV.3 
(5 x 42) + (9.73 x 13) + (0.28 x 20) 
= = 4.56 
(42 + 13 + 20) 
Matching the value of equivalent impact against the scale in Figure IV.7 




of soil is moderately deteriorative 
high AND Water table 
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All other factors' performance impacts combinations (75 combinations) 
can be found using this approach. The developed form of rule can be used 
in an expert system such as fuzzy expert system. A sample of these rules 
are shown in Table IV.23. 
















Very highly deteriorative 
Very highly deteriorative 
Very highly deteriorative 
Very highly deteriorative 
Very highly deteriorative 
Very highly deteriorative 
Very highly deteriorative 
: 
: 
Very lightly deteriorative 
Very lightly deteriorative 



































ii. Physical Factors 
1) Number of performance combination 
The number of performance combination can be calculated for the 
physical factors by multiplying the number of performance stages of the 
factors. In this research, the number of different performance 
combinations needed to cover all the combination possibilities can be 
found as: 
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number of physical rules 
= 2 (diameter) x 8 (pipe material) 
x 5 (pipe age) 
x 3 (protection method) = 240 rules 
Equation IV.4 
Example: IF pipe diameter is small AND pipe material is ductile 
AND 
pie: it pipe diameter is smau /\INL> pipe material is aucin 
pipe age is old AND pipe protection method is Cathodic protection. 
iron 
2) Weights of factors 
This is discussed in section IV. 1.1. Weights of Factors. The normalized 
global weights or the local weights can be used in this process as shown 
in Table 1V.24. 





























3) Factors performance impacts 
The factors performance impacts at different stages (collected in section 
IV. 1.2. Factors Performance Impact) is measured by a scale as shown in 
Figure 1V.6. 
To illustrate how this scale works, an example is given below: 
• If pipe diameter is small then risk of failure is very high (8.33 
impact value) 
_ _ _ _ _ 
• If pipe material is ductile iron then risk of failure is very low (1.67 
impact value) 
• If pipe age is old then the risk of failure is very high (8.33 impact 
value) 
• If pipe protection method is cathodic protection then the risk of 
failure is very low (1.67 impact value) 
4) Factors performance combined impact 
In order to find the combined impact of the different factors' 
performance, weighted average method is used as shown in Equation IV.2 
which is matched against another scale that is divided into ranges of 
different equivalent impact as shown in Figure IV.7. 
Continuing the example shown above, the combined impact is found and 
the rule is established. So, 
Equivalent impact 
_ (8.33 X 19) + (1.67 X 30) + (8.33 X 40) + (1.67 X 15) Equation IV.5 
~ (19 + 30 + 40 + 15) 
= 5.4 
Matching the value of equivalent impact against the scale in Figure IV.7 
yields that the linguistic equivalent impact is medium. So the rule will be 
completed as: 
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IF pipe diameter is small AND pipe 
is old AND pipe 
failure is Medium. 
protection method 
material is ductile iron 





All other factors' performance impacts combinations (240 combinations) 
can be found using this approach. The developed form of rule can be used 
in an expert system such as fuzzy expert system. A sample of these rules 
are shown in Table IV.25. 




























Cast iron post war 
Cast iron post war 

























































Hi. Operational Factors 
1) Number of performance combination 
The number of performance combination can be calculated for the 
operational factors by multiplying the number of performance stages of 
the factors. In this research, the number of different performance 
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combinations needed to cover all the combination possibilities can be 
found as: 
number of operational rules 
= 3 (breakage rate) 
Equation IV.6 
x 5 (hydraulic factor) 
x 5 (water quality) 
x 5 (leakage rate) — 375 rules 
Example: IF breakage rate is high AND hydraulic factor (roughness test) 
is rough AND water quality is very bad AND leakage rate is medium. 
2) Weights of factors 
This is discussed in section IV. 1.1. Weights of Factors. The normalized 
global weights or the local weights can be used in this process as shown 
in Table IV.26. 































3) Factors performance impacts 
The factors performance impacts at different stages (collected in section 
IV. 1.2. Factors Performance Impact) is measured by a scale as shown in 
Figure IV.6. 
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To illustrate how this scale works, an example is given below: 
• If breakage rate is high then risk of failure is extremely high (9.17 
impact value) 
• If hydraulic factor (roughness test) is rough then risk of failure is 
very high (8.33 impact value) 
• If water quality is very bad then the risk of failure is extremely 
high (9.17 impact value) 
• If leakage rate is medium then the risk of failure is medium (5 
impact value) 
4) Factors performance combined impact 
In order to find the combined impact of the different factors' 
performance, weighted average method is used as shown in Equation IV.2 
which is matched against another scale that is divided into ranges of 
different equivalent impact as shown in Figure IV.7. 
Continuing the example shown above, the combined impact is found and 
the rule is established. So, 
Equivalent impact 
_ (9.17 X 35) + (8.33 X 13) + (9.17 X 17) + (5 X 20) Equation IV.7 
~ (35 + 13 + 17 + 20) 
= 8.06 
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Matching the value of equivalent impact against the scale in Figure IV.7 
yields that the linguistic equivalent impact is very high. So the rule will 
be completed as: 
IF breakage rate is high AND hydraulic factor (roughness test) is rough 
AND water quality is very bad AND leakage rate is medium THEN risk 
of failure is very high. 
All other factors' performance impacts combinations (375 combinations) 
can be found using this approach. The developed form of rule can be used 
in an expert system such as fuzzy expert system. A sample of these rules 
are shown in Table IV.27. 
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iv. Post failure Factors 
1) Number of performance combination 
The number of performance combination can be calculated for the post 
failure factors by multiplying the number of performance stages of the 
factors. In this research, the number of different performance 
combinations needed to cover all the combination possibilities can be 
found as: 
number of post failure rules 
= 5 (repair cost) 
x 3 (damage to surrounding) 
Equation IV. 8 
x 4 (loss of production) 
x 5 (traffic disruption) 
x 3 (type of serviced area) 
= 900 rules 
Example: IF repair cost is low AND damage to surrounding is in 
industrial area AND loss of production is in small redundant pipe AND 
traffic disruption is lightly disruptive AND type of serviced area is 
industrial. 
2) Weights of factors 
This is discussed in section IV.1.1. Weights of Factors. The normalized 
global weights or the local weights can be used in this process as shown 
in Table IV.28. 
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400 1 23 
Damage to surroundings 21 j 420 
Loss of Production 18 360 
Traffic Disruption 17 340 





3) Factors performance impacts 
The factors performance impacts at different stages (collected in section 
IV.1.2. Factors Performance Impact) is measured by a scale as shown in 
Figure IV.6. 
To illustrate how this scale works, an example is given below: 
• If repair cost is low then risk of failure is very low (1.67 impact 
value) 
• If damage to surrounding is in industrial area then risk of failure is 
extremely high (9.72 impact value) 
• If loss of production is in small redundant pipe then the risk of 
failure is very low (1.67 impact value) 
• If traffic disruption is lightly disruptive then the risk of failure is 
very low (1.67 impact value) 
• If type of serviced area is industrial then the risk of failure is very 
high (8.33 impact value) 
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4) Factors performance combined impact 
In order to find the combined impact of the different factors' 
performance, weighted average method is used as shown in Equation IV.2 
which is matched against another scale that is divided into ranges of 
different equivalent impact as shown in Figure IV.7. 
Continuing the example shown above, the combined impact is found and 
the rule is established. So, 
Equivalent impact 
_ (1.67 x 20) + (9.72 x 21) + (1.67 x 18) + (1.67 x 17) + (8.33 + 14 
_ (20 + 21 + 18 + 17 + 14) E q ] 
= 4.58 
Matching the value of equivalent impact against the scale in Figure IV.7 
yields that the linguistic equivalent impact is medium. So the rule will be 
completed as: 
IF repair cost is low AND damage to surrounding is in industrial area 
AND loss of production is in small redundant pipe AND traffic 
disruption is lightly disruptive AND type of serviced area is industrial 
THEN risk of failure is medium. 
All other factors' performance impacts combinations (900 combinations) 
can be found using this approach. The developed form of rule can be used 
in an expert system such as fuzzy expert system. A sample of these rules 
are shown in Table IV.29. 
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v. Risk of failure Factors 
1) Number of performance combination 
The number of performance combination can be calculated for the main 
risk factors by multiplying the number of performance stages of the 
factors. In this research, the number of different performance 
combinations needed to cover all the combination possibilities can be 
found as: 
number of post failure rules 
— 7 (environmantal factor) 
x 7 (physical factor) 
x 7 (operational factor) 
x 7 (post failure factor) = 2401 rules 
Equation IV. 10 
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Example: IF environmental factor is moderately low AND physical factor 
is very high AND operational factor is moderately high AND post failure 
factor is very low. 
2) Weights of factors 
This is discussed in section IV. 1.1. Weights of Factors. The normalized 
global weights or the local weights can be used in this process as shown 
in Table IV.28. 
























3) Factors performance impacts 
The factors performance impacts at different stages (collected in section 
IV.1.2. Factors Performance Impact) is measured by a scale as shown in 
Figure IV.6. 
To illustrate how this scale works, an example is given below: 
• 
• 
If environmental factor is moderately 
moderately low (3.33 impact value) 
If physical factor 
impact value) 
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• If operational factor is moderately 
moderately high (6.67 impact value) 
• If post failure factor 
(1.67 impact value) 
high then the risk 





4) Factors performance combined impact 
In order to find the combined impact of the different factors' 
performance, weighted average method is used as shown in Equation 1V.2 
which is matched against another scale that is divided into ranges of 
different equivalent impact as shown in Figure IV.7. 
Continuing the example shown above, the combined impact is found and 
the rule is established. So, 
Equivalent impact 
_ (3.33 x 19) -r (9.72 x 43) + (6.67 x 28) + (1.67 x 20) 
- (19 + 43 + 28 + 20) 
= 6.38 
Matching the value of equivalent impact against the scale in Figure IV.7 
yields that the linguistic equivalent impact is moderately high. So the rule 
will be completed as: 
IF environmental factor 
high AND operational 
is very low THEN 
is moderately low AND 
factor is moderately high 
risk of failure is moderately high. 
physical 
AND post 
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All other factors' performance impacts combinations (2401 
combinations) can be found using this approach. The developed form of 
rule can be used in an expert system such as fuzzy expert system. A 
sample of these rules are shown in Table IV.31. 
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IV.2. Case Study Data Sets 
In this stage, the performance data is collected from real networks under operation. Three 
sets of data are collected from municipalities in New Brunswick and Ontario. 
IV.2.1. Data Set One 
The data of this case study is collected from the City of Moncton, New Brunswick, 
Canada. The City of Moncton operates a water supply and distribution system which 
provides water to 95% of its population. The approximate length of the water main is 448 
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km. It serves more than 58,000 people. Cast iron water mains account for about 39% of 
all the water main, followed by ductile iron with 31%. PVC water mains account for 
19%. Asbestos cement (3%) accounts for a much smaller part of the system (Dillon 
Consulting and Harfan Technologies, 2003). 
The factors included in dataset one are: pipe material, pipe diameter, installation year, 
protection method, number of breakage, Hazen-William factor, and loss of production 
(pipe diameter). The number of records in this data set is only 544. The actual data is 
much bigger than this number, however, these 544 records are the only records that have 
information about their current status (breakage rate, Hazen-William coefficient ...etc). 
Some statistics about the 544 records data set are shown in Table IV.32. The percentages 
of the pipe material used in the Moncton system is shown in Figure IV.8, which shows 
that the most used pipe material is Post War Cast Iron (built after World War II). 
Table IV.32 - Moncton data set statistics. 
Pipe Material 
Asbestos 
Cast Iron (Pre WW II) 
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Figure IV.8 - Percentages of pipe materials used in Moncton. 
IV.2.2. Data Set Two 
This case study is derived from Case Study one by assuming the unavailable qualitative 
factors. This data set is built to show and study the results of the model when information 
about all the factors incorporated in the model is available to the management team. The 
factors assumed in this dataset are: type of soil, average daily traffic, water table level, 
water quality, leakage rate, cost of repair, damage to surroundings, traffic disruption, and 
type of serviced area. The data is randomly assumed and does not fit any distribution. 
However, the values are assumed in the higher risk performance of the factors. The 
number of records in this data set is 544. 
IV.2.3. Data Set Three 
The data in this case study is collected from the City of London, Ontario, Canada. The 
information included in this data set is: type of soil, average daily traffic, pipe material, 
pipe diameter, installation year, protection method, number of breaks, hydraulic factor, 
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and loss of production. The number of records in this data set is 1702. Some statistics 
about this 1702-record database are shown in Table IV.33. The percentages of pipe 
material used in the London database are shown in Figure IV.9, which shows that the 
most used pipe material is Post War Cast Iron (built after WW II) and which accounts for 
66% of the network. 
Table IV.33 - London data set statistics. 
Pipe Material 
Cast Iron (Pre WW II) 
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Figure IV.9 - Percentages of pipe materials used in London. 
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Chapter V: HIERARCHICAL FUZZY EXPERT SYSTEM FOR 
RISK OF WATER MAIN FAILURE 
Maintaining a water main in good condition requires the adoption of a 
maintenance/repair plan which prioritizes and ranks the most critical (risky) 
pipelines. This can be done by using an expert system that makes use of the 
expert opinions and experiences in the specified field. In this section, the 
development of a fuzzy expert system for water main failure risk is explained 
and discussed. Figure V.l shows the different topics covered in this chapter that 
explain the steps followed in building the hierarchical fuzzy system. 
V.l. Risk Factors Incorporated in the Model 
In this step, the failure risk factors are identified and selected. Sixteen factors are 
incorporated in this model, which represents the deterioration and post-failure factors. 
These factors are extracted from Table 11.3 which lists the deterioration factors that 
contribute to the pipeline failure event and from section "II.2.3. Consequences of 
Failure", which lists some of the consequences (cost) of a failure event. The deterioration 
factors chosen to be incorporated in this model are selected based on the ease of gaining 
the required attributes of the water main by the facility managers. These attributes can be 
gathered from different types of documents such as: design information, visual inspection 
reports, maintenance reports, etc. The cost of failure (consequence) factors are difficult to 
quantify and thus a qualitative approach will be followed. The factors selected to be 
incorporated in the pipeline failure risk model are shown in Figure III.2. 
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Figure V.l - Chapter layout of hierarchical fuzzy expert system for water main failure risk. 
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V.2. Hierarchical Fuzzy Model 
The hierarchical fuzzy model structure consists of four branches (models) which 
correspond to the four main factors and another model that combines the results 
of the four branches of the hierarchy to produce risk of failure. These are: 
Environmental, Physical, Operational, Post-failure branches and risk of failure 
model as shown in Figure V.2. This hierarchical structure will facilitate the 
creation of a pre-failure model which combines three factors (environmental, 
physical, and operational) to produce a pre-failure index or the possibility of 
failure index on a scale of 0 to 10 as shown in Figure V.3. The post-failure 
model represents the consequence(s) of failure. The fuzzy structure of each of 
the five models is identical and only the membership functions of each factor in 
each model and the knowledge base rules of each model are different. The full 
view of the hierarchical fuzzy model is shown in Figure V.4 which shows the 
processing of the observations characteristics of the water main network. 
(Risk of Water maini 
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Figure V.2 - Hierarchical fuzzy failure risk Model. 
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Figure V.3 — Hierarchical fuzzy possibility of failure models. 





















































The crisp defuzzified results of the four models (environmental, physical, 
operational, and post-failure) are combined together through a risk of failure 
model which calculates the risk of failure index of a water main as shown in 
Figure III.4. The use of a hierarchical fuzzy expert system is a key to reducing 
the total number of required expert rules. In this model, if a hierarchical fuzzy 
system is not used, then the total number of rules required to cover all of the 
possible factor performance combinations is calculated by the simple 
multiplication of the number of factors performances of each of the sixteen 
factors. Section A. 10. Hierarchical fuzzy expert system in Appendix A includes 
more information about this topic. 
V.3. Fuzzy Sets Definitions and Membership Functions 
The membership functions of the different factors are built based on the 
information gathered from the literature, such as the characteristics of each 
factor, and the effects of these characteristics on the risk of failure. The 
qualitative factors are evaluated on a 0-10 scale and assigned a standard five 
membership functions. In this section, the established fuzzy sets for each of the 
factors are shown as follows: 
V.3.1. Environmental Model 
It includes soil type, water table level, and average daily traffic. 
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Soil Type 
Soil type affects the external corrosion rate of metallic pipes and thus is considered one of 
the mort important factors. Specific types of soil can lead to biochemical, 
electrochemical, and physical reactions which can degrade the pipe material and make it 
vulnerable to structural degradation, which then results in thinning or weakening of the 
pipe material, causing the material to lose its ability to resist the forces in the surrounding 
soil (Hahn et al. 2002). Soil is typically classified by grain size according to the Unified 
Soil Classification System as coarse grained and fine grained which in their turn are 
classified as Gravel, Sand, Clay and Silt with liquid limit > 50, and Clay and Silt with 
liquid limit < 50. However, the most important soil characteristic for water mains is the 
presence of chemicals that deteriorate pipeline material, and the interaction between the 
soil and the pipe material. Thus, soil is classified according to potential corrosiveness as 
highly corrosive, moderately corrosive, and low corrosive (Al Barqawi, 2006). Soil 
uniformity is also considered an important factor. When the pipe is in contact with 
dissimilar soil types, localized corrosion cells can be developed which contribute to 
metallic pipe material corrosion. Moreover, soil pH is considered a good indicator of 
external corrosion because corrosion occurs in a certain range of pH (Najafi, 2005). There 
are many soil characteristics that play a role in the deterioration process and thus make 
studying their effects complex and beyond the scope of this research. Therefore, for this 
research, the soil is classified into five subjective groups according to the strength of 
deterioration action as very highly deteriorative, highly deteriorative, moderately 
deteriorative, lightly deteriorative, and very lightly deteriorative. The membership 
functions and their characteristics are shown in Figure V.5. The data type to be used for 
P a g e | 89 
this factor is numerical from 0 to 10 where 0 indicates the least deteriorative soil 











Figure V.5 - Soil type membership functions. 
Water Table Level 
The effect of water table on pipeline materials is due to the presence of certain 
salts and other corrosive materials dissolved in the water. Another adverse effect 
of the presence of groundwater is the tendency of the water to cause corrosion of 
metallic pipelines. Al Barqawi (2006) classified the groundwater level as high, 
moderate, or low. There is little work that covers the effect of groundwater on 
water mains in comparison to sewer mains. In regard to sewer mains, the 
presence of groundwater is classified as above or below invert and whether it is 
stable or varies seasonally (Hahn et al. 2002). Moreover, the rate of frost heaves 
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(Najafi, 2005). The easily observed characteristic of groundwater which can be 
monitored is the presence of it. So it can be classified as always present, 
seasonally present, and rarely present. The membership functions and their 
characteristics are shown in Figure V.6. The membership functions of the water 
table level are discrete and a 0.95 confidence level (certainty) is assumed. The 
data type to be used for this factor is linguistic and chosen from this list: rarely 














rarely present seasonally 
present 
always present 
Figure V.6 — Water table lever membership functions. 
Average Daily Traffic 
The daily traffic on the road above a buried pipeline creates a dynamic load on 
the pipeline. Dynamic forces that cause structural defects are either large, one-
time events or smaller cyclic events that occur at a variety of frequencies (daily 
or seasonally). Large, one-time events include periods of heavy surface 
construction, in-ground utility construction, or non-construction events, such as 
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earthquakes or landslides. This type of dynamic load is beyond the scope of this 
research and only the smaller cyclical dynamic loads caused by routine truck, 
machinery, bus, or train traffic is considered in this research (Hahn et al. 2002). 
Moreover, the depth of pipelines plays a role in transferring the dynamic surface 
load into pipes structure (the greater the depth, the lesser the load transferred to 
the pipe structure). Al Barqawi (2006) classified this factor into high, moderate, 
and low according to average daily traffic. Raven (2007) classified road types 
into (1) paved, (2) low/moderate traffic, and (3) high traffic. In this research, 
daily traffic is classified into 5 subjective groups as very heavy, heavy, 
moderate, light and very light average daily traffic. The membership functions 
and their characteristics are shown in Figure V.7. The data type to be used for 
this factor is numerical from 0 to 10 where 0 indicates the lightest average daily 
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Figure V.7 - Average daily traffic membership functions. 
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V.3.2. Physical Model 
This model includes pipe diameter, pipe material, pipe age, and protection 
method factors. 
Pipe Diameter 
According to Al Barqawi (2006), pipe size is one of the most important factors 
that contribute to the pipeline failure. In his investigation of risk factors in urban 
pipeline failure, Raven (2007) classified pipeline diameter into three groups: 
group 1 (4 in. to 8 in.), group 2 (10 in. to 30 in.), and group 3 (36 in. to 72 in.). 
Ozger (2003) developed a regression model to estimate water main breakage 
rate -- one of his findings is that the breakage rate of pipelines decreases as the 
pipe diameter increases. This is because larger diameter pipes have more beam 
strength than smaller diameter pipes (Najafi, 2005). In light of the above review, 
the pipe diameter factor is classified into 2 groups as small (less than 250 mm) 
and medium (250 mm to 500 mm). The large diameter pipelines (greater than 
500 mm) are not considered here, since they are used in transmission water 
mains, which are beyond the scope of this research. The membership functions 
and their characteristics are shown in Figure V.8. The data type to be used for 
this factor is pipeline diameter, up to 500 millimeters. 
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Figure V.8 - Pipe diameter membership functions. 
Pipe Material 
There are three main categories of pipeline materials that are used in the 
construction of pressurized pipelines: cement-based, plastic, and metallic. Each 
category of pipeline material includes a variety of materials. The pipeline 
materials considered in this research are summarized in Figure V.9. There are 
other types of pipeline material which are not considered in this research; 
Verified Clay pipes are only used in sewer pipelines due to their low tensile 
strength, and Glass-Reinforced Plastic (Fiberglass) pipe, which is traditionally 
used in industrial applications and large diameter (transmission) municipal water 
mains (Najafi, 2005). 
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•medium 








Med. or High Density 
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Figure V.9 - Pipeline materials. 
The risk of exterior pipe deterioration depends on the pipe material, which is 
susceptible to acidic substances and galvanic corrosion. Acidic soils or 
groundwater attack unprotected cementious or metallic pipe materials, while 
stray currents in the ground cause galvanic corrosion with metal or metal 
reinforced pipes. Erosion is often a problem in concrete, asbestos cement, and 
metallic pipes (Hahn et al. 2002). Another aspect that should be considered 
regarding pipe material is the pipe vintage. This concept is especially related to 
cast iron water mains. Water mains made of cast iron were produced using two 
different casting methods; before and after the Second World War. Post-war cast 
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iron pipes (made by open casting) are more vulnerable to failure in long-term 
performance. For this reason, cast iron pipes are categorized as pre-war and 
post-war cast iron (between 1950 and 1970) (Dillon Consulting and Harfan 
Technologies, 2003). According to Al Barqawi's (2006) findings, pipeline 
material is considered the second most important factor in the pipeline 
deterioration process. The membership functions and their characteristics are 
shown in Figure V.10. The membership functions of pipe materials are discrete 
and a 0.95 confidence level (certainty) is assumed. Examining the effects of 
different confidence levels (80 to 100) shows that the model is not very sensitive 
to this value. The data type to be used for this factor is linguistic and chosen 
from this list: Concrete, Asbestos, PVC, PE, Ductile iron, Steel, Cast iron, and 














Concrete Asbestos PVC PE Ductile iron Steel Cast iron Cast iron 
post war 
Figure V.10 - Pipe material membership functions. 
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Pipe Age 
Pipe age is considered the most important factor in indicating the level of 
pipeline deterioration (Al Barqawi, 2006). Pipelines usually have a 'bathtub' 
rate of failure relative to the age of the pipes as shown in Figure V . l l . Early 
failure is due to human factors in the actual laying of the pipe, such as 
manufacturing faults. The second part of the curve has a low failure rate. In the 
third part of the curve, the failure rate increases exponentially as the pipeline 







Figure V.l 1 - Bathtub curve of pipe performance with age (Najafi, 2005). 
Kleiner et al. (2004) divided the age range into five membership functions: new, 
young, medium, old, and very old. In this research, similar assumptions are 
used. The age membership functions and their characteristics are shown in 
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Figure V.12. The data type to be used for this factor is the installation year of the 
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Figure V.12 - Pipe age membership functions. 
Protection Method 
Pipelines should be protected against potential corrosion and deterioration. 
Many corrosion protection methods are being applied in the field of pipeline 
protection especially for pipelines made of iron and steel materials. Other types 
of pipe materials such as reinforced concrete, plastics, and composites also 
undergo forms of corrosion or different environmental or stress-related 
deterioration. For instance, Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) pipes have a high 
resistance to deterioration and can be used in very corrosive environments, but 
they are likely to be affected by deterioration if they are exposed to weather, 
chemical attack, or mechanical degradation arising from improper installation 






methods (Al Barqawi, 2006). However, protection methods are mainly applied 
to iron and steel pipes due to their high vulnerability to corrosion. Some of the 
protection methods are internal cement mortar lining, polyurethane lining, 
polyethylene encasement or wrapping, tape coating, coal tar enamel coatings, 
epoxy or polyurethane coatings, and cathodic protection, which is the most 
effective protection method for steel pipes (Najafi, 2005). In this research, the 
protection methods are classified as cathodic protection, lining/coating, and not 
applied. The membership functions and their characteristics are shown in Figure 
V.13. The membership functions are discrete and a 0.95 confidence level 
(certainty) is assumed. Examining the effects of different confidence levels (80 
to 100) shows that the model is not very sensitive to this value. The data type 
used for this factor is linguistic, chosen from this list: Cathodic protection, 
Lining\Coating, and none. 





















Cathodic Lining\Coating none 
protection 
Figure V.13 - Protection methods membership functions. 
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V.3.3. Operational Model 
This model includes breakage rate, hydraulic factor, water quality, and leakage rate 
factors. 
Breakage Rate 
The breakage rate is measured as the number of breakage per one kilometer of 
pipeline length per year. This factor actually gives an indication of the current 
overall status of the pipeline rather than contributing exclusively to its condition. 
The breakage rate is considered the third most important factor that indicates 
material deterioration and thus the probability of failure of the pipeline (Al 
Barqawi, 2006). However, from closely studying Al Barqawi's results and 
findings, the breakage rate as a risk factor can be classified into three ranges: 
low (0 to 0.5), average (0.5 to 3), and high (> 3). Figure V.14 shows of the 
breakage rate versus the condition rating scale developed by Al Barqawi (2006) 
which is used to divide the ranges of the breakage rate membership functions. 
According to the curve analysis, the breakage rate factor changes its behavior at 
values of 0.5 and 3 brk/km/yr. The membership functions and their 
characteristics are shown in Figure V.15. The data type used for this factor is the 
number of water main breaks per one kilometer pre year with a maximum of 10 
brks/km/yr. 
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Figure V.l 5 - Breakage rate membership functions. 
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Hydraulic Factor 
The hydraulic factor is used to measure the current network performance and is 
usually indicated by the C-factor of the pipelines. A preliminary investigation of 
the hydraulic capacity of a distribution system can be done by analyzing the 
results of low-pressure complaints, hydrant-flow, rusty color occurrence, and 
visual inspection of interior pipe tests, which will give the trend of the 
distribution system's hydraulic capacity change over time and how it varies 
spatially. Detailed investigation of the hydraulic factor is carried out using 
Hazen-William factor tests (roughness test) (InfraGuide, 2003). Hydraulic 
factor is one of the important factors that give a good indication of the status of 
the network, and it is classified according to the Hazen-William factor into five 
groups (Al Barqawi, 2006). The membership functions and their characteristics 
are shown in Figure V.16. The data type to be used for this factor is the value of 
the Hazen-Willam factor with a maximum of 150 (maximum value of a new 
installation). 















Figure V.16 - Hydraulic factor membership functions. 
Water Quality 
Measuring water quality in the water distribution network gives a good 
indication about the internal condition of a pipelines' network. The preliminary 
data collected in order to assess the water quality in a distribution system is 
based on analyzing the water quality complaint records and the routine water 
quality monitoring data. Water quality can be measured based on the 
concentrations of chlorine residuals and iron in metallic mains. When chlorine 
residuals are decreased in some areas of a water system, it indicates that these 
areas are deteriorating. An increasing concentration of iron in the water indicates 
the degree of internal corrosion of unlined metallic mains (InfraGuide, 2003). In 
this research, water quality is considered as a subjective factor and classified 
into five groups: very good, good, acceptable, bad, and very bad. The 
membership functions and their characteristics are shown in Figure V.17. The 




data type used for this factor is numerical from 0 to 10 where 0 indicates the best 
water quality and 10 indicates the worst water quality. 
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Figure V.17 - Water quality membership functions. 
Leakage rate 
Leakage in the pipelines indicates the presence of cracks and/or joint failure. 
This can give a strong indication about the status of the network. There are many 
tests that can assess the network leakage. Hydrostatic leakage tests and water 
audits are the most common methods used to detect leakage in the water system 
(Al Barqawi, 2006). Leakage erodes pipe bedding and increases soil moisture in 
the pipe zone (InfraGuide, 2003). In this research, due to lack of information 
about leakage rate evaluation and rating, it is considered as a subjective factor 
and classified into five groups: very high, high, medium, low, and very low. The 
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membership functions and their characteristics are shown in Figure V.18. The 
data input to be used for this factor is numerical from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates 
the least leakage rate and 10 indicates the worst leakage rate. 
o 2 4 6 8 10 
0-10 qualitative universe of enclosure 
Figure V.l 8 - Leakage rate membership functions. 
V.3.4. Post Failure Model 
Estimating the consequences of pipeline failure is a complicated process. A 
simplification of the process is sought, therefore, and a qualitative (subjective) 
approach rather than a quantitative (objective) approach will be followed. Five 
factors are considered in this research: cost of repair, damage to 
surroundings/business disruption, loss of production, traffic reduction, and type 
of area serviced. 
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Cost of Repair 
The cost of repair is the direct cost due to a burst pipeline. However, it is 
difficult to comprehend this factor since it varies depending on the magnitude of 
failure, the area of failure, time of failure, country of failure, etc 
(Bandyopadhyay et al. 1997). The main factors which contribute to the repair 
cost are the cost of the repair material and the cost of labor. The cost of repair 
material is dependent on the original pipeline material and its characteristics, for 
example: steel pipes can be repaired by welding a steel sleeve to the position of 
pipeline burst, but it is not applicable to plastic pipes which require another type 
of repair material. On the other hand, the cost of labor is dependent on the time 
consumed and the number of laborers involved in the repair. In its turn, the time 
consumed is dependent on the pipeline cover material and depth, the presence of 
other buried utilities such as electricity power lines, telephone lines, gas lines, 
etc, the location of the failure (accessibility) (Pickard, 2007). In this research, 
cost of repair is classified into five subjective groups (on a scale of 0 to 10) as 
very high, high, medium, low, and very low. The membership functions and 
their characteristics are shown in Figure V.19. The data type to be used for this 
factor is numerical from 0 to 10 where 0 indicates the lowest and 10 indicates 
the highest cost of repair. 
P a g e | 106 
—•—» very low 





Figure V.19 - Cost of repair membership functions. 
Damage to surroundings/Business Disruption 
The most visible impact associated with a water main break is the occurrence of 
flooding affecting structures. Flooding causes quantifiable damage to structures 
and their contents which is dependent on the specific structure type, value, 
regional location and use. The cost associated with flooding is building structure 
damage and building content damages and even damage to property surrounding 
building such as gardens and sheds (Cromwell et al. 2002). In this research, the 
damage to surroundings and business disruption is classified into three groups 
according to the location of the pipeline failure as residential, commercial, and 
industrial. The membership functions and their characteristics are shown in 
Figure V.20. The data type to be used for this factor is linguistic and chosen 
from this list: Industrial, Commercial, and Residential. 
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Figure V.20 - Damage to surroundings membership functions. 
Loss of Production 
Loss of production means the loss of profit from normal service. Loss of 
production is usually dependent on the size of the pipeline, the duration from 
time of failure to time of service resumption, and the location of the pipeline and 
whether it is redundant or not. Redundancy of the water network is achieved by 
duplicating elements in the network in order to eliminate the effects of any 
single point of failure. For this reason, the loss of production is classified here 
according to pipeline size and redundancy status as small redundant, small not-
redundant, medium redundant, and medium not-redundant. The membership 
functions and their characteristics are shown in Figure V.21. The redundant and 
not-redundant pipelines share the same membership functions (overlaid each 
other). The data type to be used for this factor is pipeline diameter, up to 500 
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Figure V.21 - Loss of production membership functions. 
Traffic Disruption 
In the event of water main failure, mild to severe traffic disruption can occur. 
Traffic disruption causes inconveniences for the travelling public and can 
disrupt different businesses, in terms of customers and with freight and package 
delivery. The cost of traffic disruption is dependent on the increase of travel 
time and the value of travel time (Cromwell et al. 2002). However, the value of 
travel time is dependent on many factors by its turn. The increase of travel time 
is dependent on the type of road and traffic above the failed pipeline. In this 
research, a qualitative approach will be followed and traffic disruption as a cost 
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will be classified as a subjective factor into 5 groups as: very disruptive, 
disruptive, moderate, light, and very light. The membership functions and their 
characteristics are shown in Figure V.22. The data type to be used for this factor 
is numerical from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates the least traffic disruption and 10 






Figure V.22 - Traffic disruption membership functions. 
Type of Serviced Area 
In the case of pipeline failure, the water supply will stop serving a targeted 
destination. Hence, numerous businesses in the destination area will be 
negatively affected by the failure. The end users start to complain when they 
don't receive the service they need, which will damage the operator's reputation. 
Usually, water main networks are designed in a way to keep delivering water 
even if a failure occurs by using other paths (redundancy) (Oppenheimer, 2004). 
However, a drop in water pressure is also considered a failure. Depending on the 
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area serviced, this factor can be classified into residential, commercial, and 
industrial (Al Barqawi, 2006). The membership functions and their 
characteristics are shown in Figure V.23. The data type to be used for is 
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Figure V.23 — Type of serviced area membership functions. 
V.3.5. Risk of failure Model 
This model combines the results of the previous four models to generate the risk 
of failure of water main. Thus, the membership functions of the four main 
factors (environmental, physical, operational, and post failure) are identical to 
the standardized consequent membership functions of the four models (as will 
be explained in Section V.5. Consequents Aggregation). It consists of seven 
membership functions (extremely low, very low, moderately low, medium, 
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moderately high, very high, and extremely high) on a qualitative scale from 0 to 
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Figure V.24 - Fuzzification membership functions of the four main factors in the risk of failure model. 
V.4. Fuzzy Inference 
In this research, the indirect knowledge acquisition method (by means of a 
questionnaire and the available literature) is used to develop the knowledge base 
of the risk of water main failure model as shown in IV.1.3. Expert knowledge 
base. 
The Mamdani fuzzy rules system type is used in the fuzzy model, which has an 
advantage over the Takagi-Sugeno-Kang (TSK) method of being easier to 
understand and the consequents of the system is defined in terms of fuzzy sets as 
explained in Section "A.6.1. Mamdani Method". The Mamdani method is based 
on a simple structure of Min operations as follows: 
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/? ;: If xt is A[ and x2 is A2 and x3 is A3 and ...xn is A]n THEN y is fiJ 
Where RJ is the j-th rule, A{ (j = 1,2,... N,i = 1,2, ...n),Bj are the fuzzy 
subsets of the inputs and outputs respectively. 
This rule can be written mathematically as Equation V.l: 
, , . » « « Equation V.l Hi ix1,x2,x3,..., xn, y) = UJ A n.i A HJ ... A ju / A Ms 
" l " 2 3 -"n 
Where A denotes the minimum operator. 
In this research, the consequent linguistic variable B is standardized on a list of 
seven linguistic variables (Extremely low, Very low, Moderately Low, Medium, 
Moderately High, Very High, and Extremely High as shown in Figure V.25). 
This is applicable to each model of the five models (environmental, physical, 
operational, post failure, and risk of failure). 
V.5. Consequents Aggregation 
After evaluating each rule in the knowledge base, the membership value of each 
consequent membership function (output linguistic variable) is aggregated using 
a maximum operation as shown in Equation V.2. In other words, the maximum 
membership value of any consequent membership function (shown in Figure 
V.25) is used to truncate that consequent membership function for later use in 
the denazification of the fuzzy output. 
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N 
Hn(x1,X2,X3,...,Xn,y) = \J[liR)(x1,X2,Xz,...,Xn,y)} Equation V.2 
7=1 
Where V denotes the maximum operation, R represents each of the consequent 
membership functions as standardized to the list of (Extremely low, Very low, 
Moderately Low, Medium, Moderately High, Very High, and Extremely High). 
This is also applicable to each model of the five models (environmental, physical, 
operational, post failure, and risk of failure). 
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Figure V.25 - Consequent membership functions. 
V.6. Defuzzification Process 
There are many defuzzification methods that convert the fuzzy consequents of 
all of the triggered fuzzy rules to a crisp value. The method used in this research 
is the Center of Sum as shown in Equation V.3. 
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Crisp Risk Output = 
extremely high . extremely high 
y Truncated Arean x Centeriodn I y 
n=extremely low ' n=extreme 
Truncated Arean 
^ tr l  ' n=extremely low 
Equation V.3 
This equation calculates the center of gravity of each truncated consequent 
membership function found from the previous step (neglecting the union 
operation) and then average-weights them by their areas. It has the advantage of 
being simple to program, requiring less computer resources, and it gives 
reasonable results. Section A.7. Defuzzification Methods in Appendix A 
contains more information. 
This is also applicable to each model of the five models (environmental, 
physical, operational, post failure, and risk of failure). 
V.7. System Analysis and Verification 
Two different approaches are used to test and verify the developed model and system. 
The first approach is system sensitivity analysis (stability testing), which tests the effects 
of the different factors on the behaviour of the model. The second approach is model 
accuracy testing which uses a validated AHP deterioration model to verify the results of 
the developed model. 
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V.7.1. Sensitivity Analysis and System Stability Testing 
The sensitivity and stability of the model have to be tested in order to insure that the 
model is performing as expected under different model parameters. Therefore, several 
scenarios are assumed and applied to the model and the results are examined for any 
illogicality. The scenarios are as follows: 
1. Lowest and highest risk of failure (ID numbers 1 and 2 in Table V.l). By 
analyzing the results, the maximum theoretical risk of failure that the model can 
generate is 9.4 and the minimum is 0.6. This is due the fact that the method used 
in defuzzification is Center of Sum, which calculates the center of the area under 
the triangular membership functions and thus limits the risk index to a maximum 
of 9.4 and a minimum of 0.6. However, the actual maximum risk of failure that 
can be generated by the model is 8.8 and the minimum is 1.7, due to the 
behavior of certain physical factors since there is no Extremely High Risk output 
membership functions used in the model for the Pipe Diameter and Protection 
Method factors, due to the performance conflicts of different factors (e.g. 
cathodic protection can not accompany PE or PVC pipes, pipe diameter 
performance conflicts with loss of production performance). 
2. Sensitivity analysis by increasing the risk of failure values. This is done by 
increasing the adverse effect (riskier performance) of the factors (one at a time), 
starting from the factor that has the highest weight among the considered factors 
and ending with the factor that has the lowest weight (ID number 3 to 112 in 
Table V.l and Appendix C). By analyzing this scenario, it is noticeable that the 
risk of failure index is changing at a quicker pace in the early stages (for the first 
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factors) and at a slower pace in the later stages (in the last factors) as shown in 
Figure V.26. This is due to the fact that the factors with the highest weight are 
examined first and the factors with the lowest weights are examined at the end, 
where they don't have enough power to make a noticeable change. Figure V.26 
shows jump steps in the results. This occurs for several reasons, such as the 
change in the factor status alone is not enough to make a change in the final 
result. Other reasons are the rules evaluation and aggregation, and the use of the 
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Figure V.26 - Sensitivity analysis of the model. 
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3. Close testing of the factor that has the highest weight in the physical model. This 
is the Age factor at an increment of 10 years, as shown in Table V.l. Analyzing 
the results, which tests the Age factor (fixing the rest of the physical factors at 
medium consequents) and draws a curve for the physical risk values (Figure 
V.27), it shows a steady stage at the start (10 to 30 years) and at the end (50 to 
80 years) and a smooth increasing stage in the middle of the curve (30 to 50 
years). This is because the model maps five input membership functions in this 
factor to seven output membership functions which will cause unevenly 
distributed results (two close membership functions at the beginning and two at 
the end of the curve and one membership function in the middle of the curve). 
However, by analyzing the effect of age factor on the risk of failure values, one 
can observe that it is difficult to make a change in the risk of failure value by 
only changing the performance of one factor, since the other fifteen factors try to 
resist the change in the risk values, as shown in Figure V.26. Testing the Age 
factor when the other factors are absent will give an indication of how the 
system performs when there is no resistance from other factors. Figure V.28 
shows a graph of the physical index of the age factor alone. The stable part at the 
very end of the graph is due to the shape of the fuzzy membership functions of 
the age factor (a trapezoidal membership function). 
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Figure V.27 — Sensitivity analysis of Age factor on physical risk assuming other physical factors are 
present. 
Figure V.28 - Sensitivity analysis of Age factor on physical risk assuming other physical factors are absent. 
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4. Close testing the physical model (chosen here because the two factors under 
study are parts of this model) and risk of failure model sensitivity towards 
change in the consequents of the two highest weighted factors (Age and Pipe 
material). This is done through three scenarios by fixing the values of the other 
physical factors at the medium consequents (all other physical factors are 
present), at the highest risk consequents, and at the lowest risk consequents, and 
at the same time changing the values of the factors under study from lowest to 
highest risks consequents (Table V.2). Analyzing the results of physical model 
sensitivity towards the age and pipe material factors and analyzing Figure V.29, 
Figure V.31, and Figure V.32, it is obvious that the physical model is more 
sensitive toward the age factor (which has the highest weight) since it causes a 
change in the physical risk at medium risk level from 3.5 to 6.7 with a steeper 
curve (compared to the other factor, pipe material). However, the pipe material 
factor causes a change in the physical risk at medium risk level from 4.2 to 6.0 
with a smoother curve. Figure V.30 shows that due to the very close weights of 
the age and pipe material factors (30 and 40), the risk of failure model has the 
same sensitivity towards these two factors where they both cause a change in 
failure risk value from 5.0 to 5.8. As a result, each of the four models 
(environmental, physical, operational, and post failure) is more sensitive to its 
own factors than the risk of failure model is. This fact is due to the use of a 
hierarchical system where the farther the factor is in the hierarchy, the less its 
effectiveness (sensitivity) to the top level model is. 
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Figure V.30 - Risk of failure model sensitivity analysis of age and pipe material factors at medium risk 
level. 
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Figure V.32 — Physical model sensitivity analysis of age and pipe material factors at low risk level. 
5. Close testing of the sensitivity of the physical and risk of failure models toward 
the weights of the two most-weighted factors (age and pipe material) within two 
times their standard deviation. This will examine the effect of the standard 
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deviation and the change of the mean values. The mean weight of the age factor 
is 40 with a standard deviation of 16, whereas the mean weight of pipe material 
is 30 with a standard deviation of 12. This test is performed by fixing the values 
of the other factors at their least risky effect and fixing the value of the factor 
under study at its most risky effect in order to get the most sensitive case. After 
that, the test is conducted by changing the value of the weight within the 
associated standard deviation (from different expert opinions as shown in Table 
IV. 1) at steps of five units and then calculating the physical and risk of failure 
values as shown in Table V.3. Analyzing the results of this scenario as shown in 
Table V.3, Figure V.33, and Figure V.34, it can be deduced that the physical 
model is not very sensitive to the weight of the examined factors within the 
factors' standard deviations. Changing the weight of the age factor will cause a 
change in the physical risk from 3.3 to 5.0 and the change in pipe material 
weight will also make a change from 3.3 to 5.0. The change of the value of the 
weight from (n — a) to (jU + o) will result in only 1.7 units of difference which 
is not a large difference. This is because of the presence of other factors that act 
as resistances to the change in the risk values. Figure V.33 shows that the 
physical model starts to be sensitive toward the change in age factor weight 
when the weight is reduced below 30. However, the physical model shows more 
sensitivity toward the pipe material weight, as shown in Figure V.34, which can 
be attributed to the rules evaluation and aggregation, and to the defuzzification 
process of the fuzzy output which results in steps in the output, as shown above 
in the second sensitivity scenario (Figure V.26). In addition, the risk of failure 
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model shows low sensitivity to the change of the weight of the age and pipe 
material as the risk of failure changes from 1.7 to 3.3 in the case of age factor 
and 1.7 to 2.3 for pipe material factor, as shown in Table V.3 and Figure V.35. 
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Figure V.34- Physical model sensitivity analysis toward pipe material weight. 
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Figure V.35 - Risk of failure model sensitivity analysis toward age and pipe material weights. 
6. Close testing of the sensitivity of the physical model toward the assumed value 
of pipe material certainty 95%. Certainty here refers to the level of confidence in 
the consequent part of the pipe material factor as an individual factor, as shown 
in Section V.3.2. Physical. This scenario is carried out by changing the certainty 
level from 50% to 100%. The data assumed in assessing this scenario and the 
differences between the assumed certainty level of 95% and varying certainty 
levels at 50%, 75%, and 100% are evaluated as shown in Table V.4. By 
analyzing these differences, it can be noticed that these values are very small and 
negligible. The reason behind these small differences can be attributed to many 
facts related to the use of the certainty level in the model. For instance, the 
certainty level (membership value) of the pipe material factor is not important 
unless it is the lowest membership value in the triggered rule compared to the 
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other membership valued collected from other physical factors in that rule, as 
minimum value is used among them (an AND operation that combines the 
physical factor in the knowledge rule). Moreover, the rules evaluation and 
aggregation and defuzzification process will reduce even more the effect of the 
change in certainty level of the pipe material. The maximum difference recorded 
is 0.0439 which is so small that it can be neglected. As a conclusion, the 
physical model (and other models in general) is not sensitive to the certainty 
level value of the pipe material, which is the second most important factor 
among the sixteen factors. 
As a result of the analysis conducted here before, the model(s) is sound, stable, and 
performs as expected without any irregular, illogic results. 
V.7.2. Verification of the Developed Model 
In order to verify the developed model, different approaches can be used. Experts' testing 
and feedback is one approach. Another approach is to compare the model results to the 
results of another related and validated model (Shaheen, 2005). In this context, the 
second approach will be used, which is comparing the results of the proposed model with 
another model output. The most relevant model to compare to the proposed model is the 
AHP model developed by Al Barqawi (2006). However, some points should be kept in 
mind when examining the results: 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































- The AHP model is a deterministic model and does not consider the uncertainty in 
the water main performance as the proposed model does. 
- Due to the defuzzification process and the characteristics of the fuzzy expert 
system, the results of the proposed model may show step results as explained in 
section V.7.1. Sensitivity Analysis and System Stability Testing. 
- The AHP model only considers deterioration factors and not the consequences 
(post failure factors), limiting the accuracy test to only the deterioration factors of 
the proposed model. However, the results of this test can be generalized to the 
whole proposed model since same approach is used to develop the other factors 
that are not examined in this test. 
- The AHP model is also based on experts' opinions and experience and 
consequently the results are expected to be close to those of the fuzzy expert 
system, but not exactly the same since the experts' feedback may differ on the 
basis of location, serving period, questionnaire interpretation,... etc. 
Two data sets are used to carry out the test: 500 Moncton data points and 1704 London 
data points. 
- The Moncton data is selected randomly from the data set explained in section 
1V.2.1. Data Set One. Some data points, which have characteristics not valid in 
AHP model, are excluded from the test. The factors included in this test are: pipe 
material, pipe diameter, installation year, protection method, number of breaks, 
and hydraulic factor (Hazen-William coefficient). The testing data set is first 
evaluated using the proposed fuzzy expert model and then evaluated using the 
AHP model. Sample results are shown in Table V.5. 
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Table V.5 - Sample Moncton testing results. 
H I I H H I I ^ I i l ^ l ^ H ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ S l ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ H ^ l ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ l Proposed model 






























































































































































































0.5 9% 0.10 
-0.1 1% 0.01 
0.4 8% 0.09 
-0.1 3% 0.03 
0.8 16% 0.20 
0.2 5% 0.06 
0.8 16% 0.19 
1.4 29% 0.42 
0.4 9% 0.10 
0.0 1% 0.01 
0.1 3% 0.03 
1.4 29% 0.42 
0.4 9% 0.10 
0.4 9% 0.10 
1.4 29% 0.42 
1.0 21% 0.26 
0.4 9% 0.10 
1.2 24% 0.31 
1.9 25% 0.33 
1.0 15% 0.17 
1.8 31% 0.44 
In order to judge whether the model is verified or not when using results 
comparison as is the case here, two terms can be used to determine the validity of 
the model, Average Validity Percent {AIP) and Average Invalidity Percent (AIP). 
A VP represents the validation percent out of 100 and AIP represents the prediction 




*-[% / " Equation V.4 
AVP = 1-AIP Equation V.5 
Where 
AIP : Average Invalidity Percent 
AVP : Average Validity Percent 
Et : Estimated value 
Ct : Actual value 
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Using the above equations, the following statistics can be calculated, as shown in 
Table V.6: 
Table V.6 - Model accuracy of Moncton testing results. 
Statistics 














From the above table, some conclusions can be drawn about the model accuracy. 
The average percentage difference between the outputs of the proposed model and 
the AHP model is 19.9 %. The Average Validity Percent is 74.3 %, which means 
that the proposed model is valid for predicting the output. Moreover, this test 
shows that about 7.4 % of the data has an AIP of more that 90%, and 24.4 % of 
the data fits between 80% and 90%. 
- The London data contains 1704 records as explained in section V.9.3. Case Study 
3. The factors included in this test are; type of soil, average daily traffic, pipe 
material, pipe diameter, installation year, protection method, number of breaks, 
and hydraulic factor (Hazen-William coefficient). The testing data set is first 
evaluated using the proposed fuzzy expert model and then evaluated using the 
AHP model. Sample results are shown in Table V.7. 
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Using the same approach used in the first data set is used again to judge whether 
the model is valid, the following results are obtained: 
Table V.8 - Model accuracy of London testing results. 
Statistics 














From Table V.8, some conclusions can be drawn about the model accuracy. The 
average percentage difference between the outputs of the proposed model and the 
AHP model is 19.2 %. The Average Validity Percent is 74.8 %, which means that 
the proposed model is valid for predicting the output. Moreover, the test shows 
that about 16.2 % of the data has an AIP of more that 90%, and 23.4 % of the data 
fits between 80% and 90%. 
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Checking the results obtained from the two tests and keeping in mind the points 
mentioned earlier about the AHP model, one can say that the model is accurate enough to 
be used in the industry. Furthermore, the proposed model is rather recommended to be 
used than the AHP model since it considers the uncertainty of the water main parameters, 
it considers more risk factors especially post-failure factors (consequences factors) which 
are not considered in the AHP model. 
V.8. Proposed Risk of Failure Scale 
In light of reviewing section II.5. Risk and Condition Rating Scale, a risk of failure scale 
is proposed to help the decision makers in water main management 
companies/municipalities make an informed decision. The scale ranges numerically from 
0 to 10, where 10 indicates the riskiest condition of the pipeline and 0 indicates the least 
risky condition. Linguistically, the scale is divided into five groups or regions that 
describe the risk of pipeline failure and the required corrective actions to be taken if 
needed. The number of proposed groups and their ranges and associated corrective 
actions may be changed to best suit a municipality's strategies and their risk tolerance. 
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Figure V.36 - Proposed risk of failure scale. 
The advantage of using a scale from 0 to 10 is that it provides an easy way of making 
comparisons and conversions to other types of scales such as a scale from 0 to 100 or a 
scale from 0 to 5. 
V.9. Case Study Application 
In this chapter, the developed HFES model will be applied to the collected datasets to 
analyze the situation simulating a real management problem. Three data sets are collected 
from two municipalities, the City of Moncton and the City of London as explained in 
IV.2. Case Study Data Sets. 
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V.9.1. Case Study 1 
Data set one is processed using HFES model and the proposed scale. Table V.9 shows a 
sample of the results. Table V.10 and Table V.10 summarize the results of the data set 
assessment using the proposed HFES model. It can be deduced that Cast Iron and Small 
Diameter pipes (< 250 mm) contribute most to network risk. Overall, the condition of the 
network is fair (66% of the network) with some parts of the network requiring mitigation 
action in the short-term plan as shown in Figure V.37. 
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_ , . . No. of water Proposed Action r
 main 
No action required 15 
Watch out 93 
Mitigation action in long-term plan 373 
Mitigation action in short-term plan 63 
Immediate mitigation action required 0 
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Figure V.37 - Water main risk distribution of case study 1. 
The results can be further analyzed using the GIS system which provides the opportunity 
to locate the different pipes and ease the setup of a management plan. The pipes that are 
assessed using the proposed model are shown in Figure V.39. The pipes are colored and 
grouped according to their risk of failure score. The groups are the same proposed in the 
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risk of failure scale: Very Good, Good, Fair, Risky, and Very Risky. After reviewing the 
pipelines' locations, the management team may decide to renew or rehabilitate the risky 
pipelines. However, due to the fact that the risky pipelines are located in an almost 
enclosed area, the management team may decide to include the pipelines at fair risk 
(which will need mitigation actions in the long-term plan) in the rehabilitation plan to 
save on the costs of mobilization and equipment transportation. The management team 
may include only the pipes at fair risk that are top ranked or may not include any fair risk 
pipes according to the allocated budget. Figure V.40 shows a proposed area to be 
included in a rehabilitation plan which includes both risky and fair pipes. The short-term 
rehabilitation plan can be set for every year or any other period of time depending on a 
management team's preference. It should be noted that not all the risky pipes are included 
in the plan since some are remote from the proposed area and they will require a 
considerable amount of money to rehabilitate them to account for the cost of mobilization 
and transportation, and thus the management team may be willing to carry the risk of 
failure by doing nothing to these pipes. Table V.12 shows a sample of the selected pipes 
for the short-term rehabilitation plan. Table V.13 summarizes the characteristics of the 
selected pipes. Figure V.38 illustrates a framework on how the decision can be taken 
regarding water main management using the proposed model. 
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Figure V.38 - Decision making flow chart. 





























































































































































V.9.2. Case Study 2 
Using the same weights collected from experts and the proposed scale, the data set 2 is 
processed using the developed model. Table V.14 shows a sample of the results. Table 
V.15 and Table V.16 summarize the results of processing the data set, which show that 
the Cast Iron Post War material and Small Diameter pipes contribute most to the risky 
situation of the network. Overall, the condition of the network is risky (50%) to fair 
(47%) with some parts of the network requiring immediate mitigation action as shown in 
Figure V.41. 
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Mitigation action in long-term plan 
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Figure V.41 - Water main risk distribution of case study 2. 
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V.9.3. Case Study 3 
Using the same weights collected from experts and the proposed scale, the data set is 
processed using the developed model. Table V.17 shows a sample of the results. Table 
V.18 and Table V.19 summarize the results of the data set assessment using the proposed 
fuzzy model. The overall condition of the network is fair (50%) to risky (45%) with some 
parts of the network requiring immediate mitigation action as shown in Figure V.42. 


























































































































Table V.l 8 - Case study 3 results summary. 
Proposed Action 
No action required 
Watch out 
Mitigation action in long-term plan 
Mitigation action in short-term plan 
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Table V.19 - Case study 3 pipes statistics of Fair, Risky and Very Risky status. 
rj 




































































Figure V.42 - Water main risk distribution of case study 3. 
To further analyze the outputs, the dataset's records are clustered according to pipe 
material (Cast Iron, Cast Iron post war, Ductile Iron, and PVC) and according to their 
scores (10 groups). Table V.20 and Figure V.43 show the percentages scores of each 
material (local percentages for each material are not comparable to other materials). It 
can be deduced that the majority score of the Cast Iron material falls in the range between 
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6 and 7. However, for Cast Iron Post War pipes, the scores form a triangular shape 
between 3 and 8 with a peak between 5 to 6 that has 48.66 % of the cast iron post war 
material. Ductile Iron material pipes also form a triangular shape from 2 to 7, with a peak 
between 4 and 5 with 63.86 % of the Ductile Iron material pipes. Figure V.44 shows the 
pipe material global scores percentages. It can be concluded that the Cast Iron Post War 
material contributes in large part to the fair-risky status of the London water main 
network, as 55% of that network is Cast Iron Post War with scores between 5 and 7. 
Table V.20 - Pipes material percentage score. 
Cast Iron Cast iron post war Ductile iron PVC 
• Otol ml to 2 • 2 to 3 • 3 to 4 • 4 to 5 a 5 to 6 • 6 to 7 w 7 to 8 li 8 to 9 • 9 to 10 
Figure V.43 - Pipes material local score percentage. 
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Figure V.44 - Pipes material global score percentage. 
V.10. Summary 
This chapter presented the work done in building the FHES model. It explains into details 
the different stages in the model building, starting from the considered factors and their 
linguistic membership functions, through the fuzzy rules extraction and evaluation 
process, the rules aggregation and the deffuzification process. The sensitivity of the 
FHES model is tested and analyzed and the results showed that the model is robust and 
sound. The FHES model is also verified using a validated AHP model. It also showed the 
proposed failure risk scale. Three case studied are evaluated and studied using the 
developed model in order to show the probable use of the model in the field of water 
main management. 
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Chapter VI: EXCEL-BASED APPLICATION 
DEVELOPMENT 
VI.l. Introduction 
An application was developed to implement the designed model. This 
application is based on MS© Excel 2007 and thus requires this program in order 
to run. Excel 2007 was chosen over earlier Excel versions because of the 
extended size of the worksheet which is required to handle all the fuzzy expert 
system calculations, where the earlier versions cannot handle. In addition, Excel 
2007 has more options, functions, and visual aids and it results in a compressed 
smaller file size and a lighter load on computers. 
VI.2. Working Folder and Files 
The working folder which contains the files is named as "Risk of Water Main 
Failure". This folder can be saved any where on the computer hard disk and the 
links between different excel files will still be functioning. The folder contains 
nine Excel files and these files are explained as follows: 
- Navigation: this file contains all the step-by-step instructions which will 
guide the user to an easy use of the application. Moreover, it allows the 
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user to easily fine tune the factors weights and the expert knowledge base. 
The file contains two worksheets "Control Panel" and "Fine Tune". 
"Control Panel" worksheet guides the user to setup the application and 
enter the required information to run the model. It starts with "Important 
Notice" on how to deal with security issues and how to enable the macros 
which are needed to run the application as shown in Figure VI. 1 (a). 
Then, the worksheet contains three steps which will setup and run the 
application. The first step is "Step 1 - Prepare the Data" (Figure VI. 1 (b)) 
which has a link to another excel file that stores the information about the 
different performance characteristics on the water main network. This file 
is named "Network Performance Data" and will be explained hereafter. 
The next step is "Step 2 - Prepare the Model" which controls the factors weights 
and even allows the user to save the weights according to his own preferences 
giving the user the full flexibility as shown in Figure VI. 1 (c). Moreover, the user 
can choose the factors to be incorporated in the risk assessment. 
(a) 
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Prepare your Data 
(b) 
"K&tf 7 ;^'^9t^^,*^ 
iiMai 
Fine ~uric? tho Model 
(c) 
Stop 3 - Run t h e M o d r l & S h o w t h e ResuVts 
Run the Mode! 
View the Results 
Copy the Results to a New File 
(d) 
Figure VI. 1 - Control panel worksheet in Navigation workbook. 
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In addition to that, this panel contains a button that links to the other worksheet 
"Fine Tune", which enables the user to change the expert knowledge base to best 
suit the user own experience and preferences. Figure VI.2 shows how to tune the 
Environmental Factors knowledge base. 
Environmental Factors 
•iiOTiHaro.nnnamiaBiimftniiiHinBHm.Hrornai 
if soil is Very lightly deteriorative 
if soil is Lightly deteriorative 
if soil is Moderately deteriorative 
if soil is Highly deteriorative 
if soil is Very highly deteriorative 
if ADT is Very light 
if ADT is Light 
if ADT is Moderate 
if ADT is Heavy 
if ADT is Very heavy 
3. What is 
then the risk of failure is 
then the risk of failure is 
then the risk of failure is 
then the risk of failure is 
then the risk of failure is 
then the risk of failure is 
then the risk of failure is 
then the risk of failure is 
then the risk of failure is 











if WTL is rarely present 
if WTL is seasonally present 
if WTL is always present 
HI the risk of failure is the risk of failure is 




Figure VI.2 - Fine tuning of the environmental factors attributes. 
The third and last step is "Step 3 - Run the Model & Show the Results", 
which contains "Run the Model" button that opens the six other excel 
files one by one, and runs the macros to perform the required calculations. 
These files, which are explained later in this section, are: "Environmental 
Factors", "Physical Factors", "Operational Factors", "Post Failure 
Factors", "Pre-failure Model", and "Risk of Failure Model". The "View 
the Results" button opens the "Results" file and shows the calculated risk 
of failure for each record stored in "Network Performance Data". The 
"Copy the Results to a New File" button copies the risk of failure results 
P a g e | 152 
stored temporary in the "Results" Excel file to a new file that will store 
the results permanently as shown in Figure VI. 1 (d). 
- Network Performance Data: This Excel file stores the attributes and 
performance characteristics of the water distribution network. It contains 
seventeen columns which correspond to the sixteen risk factors (Loss of 
production factor requires two columns: pipe diameter and redundancy). 
The total number of records which can be stored in this excel file is 
limited to 2000 records due to huge computer resource needed to process 
the large amount of data. Each of these columns has its own validation 
rule which will guide and restrict the user to the type and range of 
information to be input into the model. There are four more columns 
which can be used to store some notes about each record. 
- Environmental Factors, Physical Factors, Operational Factors, and Post 
Failure Factors Modules: These Excel files are considered the highest 
level in the hierarchy shown in Figure V.2. Their files structures are 
similar, and thus for illustration purposes, only the "Environmental 
Factors" Excel file structure will be explained here. This Excel file 
contains two worksheets: "Environmental Model" and "Enviro Process". 
The "Environmental Model" worksheet contains all the calculations 
required to generate the dynamic rules. The weights of the factors and the 
expert knowledge base are directly linked to the "Navigation" Excel file 
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and thus any changes made to "Navigation" will be directly reflected in 
this worksheet. This worksheet consists of two parts; part one contains the 
different environmental factors, their associated antecedents, membership 
functions and their consequents. The second part contains all the possible 
rules that are constructed and shown in Section IV.1.3. Expert knowledge 
base. The other worksheet, "Enivro Process", contains all the calculations 
required to process the data available about the network attributes and 
performance characteristics as stored in "Network Performance Data" 
file and to generate the estimated index for each record in the data. This 
worksheet contains many sections. It starts with fuzzification of the real 
data (stored in the "Network Performance Data" Excel file) in which the 
real network data is used to generate membership values for the 
membership functions of the different factors as shown in Figure VI.3 (a). 
The upper part of the table shows the membership functions of the factors 
as stored in the first worksheet "Environmental Model" which will be 
used to fuzzify the real data records. The results of fuzzification of the 
real data are shown underneath the membership functions which are 
identified by records serial numbers. The assessment of two records is 
shown in Figure VI.3. 
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Figure VI.3 - Data processing in the excel-based application. 
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Figure VI.3 (b) shows the membership functions of the Average Daily 
Traffic factor of the second record of the real data. Its results in a 0.6 
membership value for Very light membership function and a 0.4 
membership value for Light membership function. This visual aid is also 
included in the Excel file. 
The next step is to evaluate each rule in the knowledge base. When a rule is 
triggered, the minimum (And operation) membership value of the considered 
factors from the fuzzification step is calculated and stored for later use in the 
aggregation process. Figure VI.3 (c) shows the different rules and the results of 
the triggered rules for the second record of the real data. 
After assessing all of the triggered rules, the next step is to aggregate the 
membership values that resulted from last step according to the membership 
function output, and then to choose the maximum membership value (aggregation 
method is Maximum) for each linguistic membership function to be used in the 
next step, as shown in Figure VI.3 (d). It is worth mentioning that this is the same 
approach used in Matlab © software. 
The next step is to use these aggregated membership values to truncate 
the output membership functions and construct new membership 
functions that use the Center of Sum defuzzification method to get an 
Environmental Index for each record in the data set. Figure VI.3 (e) 
shows the new membership function parameters resulting from the 
truncation of the original output membership functions. 
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The calculation of the defuzzification method and the resulting 
Environmental Index are shown in Figure VI.3 (f). 
A visual aid (chart) is included in the Excel file to best present the 
calculation results, as shown in Figure VI.3 (g), where the output 
membership functions are truncated and new membership functions are 
generated accordingly. This figure also shows the Environmental Index of 
the second record calculated using the Center of Sum defuzzification 
method. 
It should be observed that these four Excel files are read-only and are not 
to be altered. Also, it is advisable to check these files only to overview the 
calculations or to see the visual aids. 
- Risk of Failure Module: The structure of this Excel file is similar to that 
of the "Environmental Factors" Excel file. This file is responsible for 
combining the results of the four main failure risk factors modules to get 
a crisp value of failure risk for a water main. The hierarchy is shown in 
Figure V.2. The partial risk indices (environmental index, physical index, 
operational index, and post-failure index) are processed as data inputs 
instead of the real data used in the second level of the hierarchy. 
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Prefailure Module: This Excel file is a duplicate of the "Risk of Failure" 
Excel file. However, it uses only three instead of four inputs: 
Environmental index, Physical index, and Operational index. A post-
failure index is precluded in this Excel file. The reason for creating such a 
file is to give an idea about the possibility of a failure event in the 
pipelines as a prefailure index as opposed to a post-failure index, as 
generated before. The hierarchy of the "Pre-failure Model" is shown in 
Figure V.3. 
- Results: This is the last Excel file in the working folder. It displays all the 
indices generated in the six Excel files (Figure VI.4). 
ID number Environmental Index 
• 
_*A » . : , " 4.5 
4.1 i g n r 
KS&M . 
-;* 5.0 S'S.o 
Figure VI.4 - The results of the application data processing. 
VI.3. Testing of the developed Application's Programming 
The objective of this section is to test the internal calculations, procedures and 
programming inside the Excel-based application using Matlab ® software. The results 
obtained from the developed HFES are compared against the results obtained using 
Matlab ©. The tested calculations are the fuzzification process, the rules triggering 
process, the fuzzy operations, and the defuzzification process. Two scenarios are 
followed to accomplish this, as explained below: 
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1. Using the operational model, the effects of each factor are increased one at a time 
from the best performance to the worst performance as shown in Table VI. 1. 
2. Using a risk of failure model, maximum and minimum scenarios together with 
eight randomly chosen values are examined as shown in Table VI.2. 
By analyzing Table VI. 1 and Table VI.2, one can note that the difference between the 
results obtained from the developed application and the Matlab ® are very small and 
minor, and is due to the different defuzzification methods (Matlab uses the Centriod 
method). Also, it can be concluded that even though the Center of Sum defuzzification 
method requires far less calculations, it generates fairly precise results. 
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An Excel-based water main failure risk assessment is developed based on the proposed 
hierarchical fuzzy expert system of water main risk of failure model. The model 
calculations and data flow is checked using Matlab software and the results show that the 
developed application passes the test are ready to be used. This application can be used 
by municipal and consultant engineers to estimate the failure risk associated with water 
mains in order to better manage their distribution network and spend the allocated budget 
more efficiently. 
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Chapter VII: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
VII.l. Summary 
This work has presented a methodology that addresses the challenge faced by 
municipalities and other authorities of prioritizing the rehabilitation of water main 
systems. It offers a model to evaluate the risk of water main failure that considers many 
risk factors, which can be divided broadly into deterioration factors that lead to the failure 
event and consequence factors that result from a failure event (failure impact). Sixteen 
failure risk factors are incorporated in the model (11 deterioration factors and 5 
consequence factors). A hierarchical fuzzy expert system (HFES), which takes into 
account the uncertainty in the water main attributes, is used to build this model. The use 
of hierarchy allows the number of knowledge base rules required to construct the model 
to be reduced. The model is verified using a validated AHP deterioration model and two 
different data sets (from the cities of Moncton, NB and London, ON). A water main 
failure risk scale is proposed, which ranges numerically from 0 to 10 where 0 indicates 
the lowest risk situation and 10 the highest risk situation. Linguistically, the scale is 
divided into five zones: "Very good, Good, Fair, Risky, and Very Risky". Each of these 
zones proposes appropriate actions to mitigate the risk, as appropriate. Three case studies, 
from different potable water networks, are assessed using the developed model. The 
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results of risk assessment of these case studies are analyzed and rehabilitation plans are 
proposed accordingly. 
Based on the developed model and the proposed failure risk scale, an Excel®-based 
application is developed to assess and evaluate the risk of failure associated with the 
water main and advises the management team of some proposed mitigating actions. 
Municipal water main managers, consultants, and contractors can use the developed 
application to assess the risk of water main failure and to plan their rehabilitation works 
accordingly. The application provides a high level of flexibility to adapt to management 
preferences and the outlook of each authority. 
VII.2. Conclusions 
This research offers a HFES model to assess the risk of failure of water mains. During the 
course of the research, many points can be noticed and concluded such as: 
• HFES model is recommended to assess the risk of failure associated with water 
main since it can deal with the vague and uncertain characteristics (factors) of the 
water main. 
• From the collected questionnaire, it can be deduced that pipe age has the highest 
effect on risk of water main failure (100 units of global weight), followed by pipe 
material (75 units) and breakage rate (57 units). 
• The more the data collected about the water main is, the more the HFES results 
accuracy is. However, it is so advisory to keep records and collect data about the 
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most important factors (most weighted) (i.e. Pipe age, material, breakage rate). 
This will result in more reliable management plans. 
• The model is more sensitive toward the most weighted factors (i.e. pipe age, pipe 
material, and breakage rate). 
• Due to the rules evaluation and aggregation, and to the defuzzification process, 
the model tends to produce results at some certain numbers and will not be 
distributed in a smooth curve, which is undesirable. 
• It is difficult to make a change in the Risk of Failure value by only changing the 
performance of one factor, since the other fifteen factors try to resist the change in 
the risk values. 
• Each of the four main branches of the hierarchy (environmental, physical, 
operational, and post failure) is sensitive to their own factors more than the risk of 
failure model is. This fact is due to the use of a hierarchical system where the 
farther the factor is in the hierarchy, the less its effectiveness (sensitivity) is. 
• It can be deduced that the model is not very sensitive to the weight of the factors 
when changed within the factors' standard deviations. 
• The Average Validity Percent of the model is 74.8 %, which means that the 
proposed model is valid for predicting the output. Moreover, the test shows that 
about 16.2 % of the data has an Average Invalidity Percent of more that 90%, and 
23.4 % of the data fits between 80% and 90%. 
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VII.3. Research Contributions 
The developed fuzzy expert model solved the problem of assessing the risk of failure 
associated with water mains. It contributes to the state of the art of sustainably managing 
water main infrastructure by achieving the following: 
• A water main failure risk model. 
• An automated tool (Excel-based application) that helps water main network 
managers build their short-term management plans and estimate their 
requirements for long-term plans. 
• A failure risk scale that will provide guidance to decision makers to make the 
best-informed decisions. 
VII.4. Limitations 
VII.4.1. Model Limitations 
The developed model uses hierarchical fuzzy expert system technique to assess the water 
main risk of failure. There are some limitations inherent in the model such as: 
• The number of collected questionnaires is twenty. The model accuracy can be 
improved by increasing the number of experts involved in building the knowledge 
base rules of the fuzzy expert system. 
• The model considers only eleven factors that indicate or contribute to the failure 
event and five factors that represent failure consequences. 
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• The input data membership functions in the model are limited to triangular and 
trapezoidal. 
• A 95% confidence level is assumed as membership constant value for all of the 
linguistic input factors (i.e. pipe material, protection method, business 
disruption,...). 
• The number of output membership functions (risk of failure membership 
functions) is limited to seven. Increasing this number will increase the accuracy of 
the model. 
• The proposed risk of failure scale only gives some recommendation on how to 
manage the water mains at different risk stages. However, it is not built on a 
sound bases and can be improved in the future work. 
VII.4.2. Application Limitations 
An Excel-based application was built based on the developed model which uses 
hierarchical fuzzy expert system. However, there are some limitations to using this 
application: 
• Even though the application leaves a flexible space for the user to choose among 
the sixteen considered factors, some other factors may come into the play, which 
are not considered in this model. 
• Expert systems are built on expert opinions and thus the knowledge database 
represents the consensus among the experts ~ however, some users may prefer to 
consider other opinions (e.g. to adapt for hot or cold climate or specific local 
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conditions). The flexibility to modify the knowledge database is therefore 
provided in the application which on the other hand causes the sensitivity analysis 
conducted in this research to be invalid. 
• Due to technical restraints (computer resources), the input membership functions 
are limited to a maximum of five and the output membership functions are limited 
to seven. 
• The developed application is based on MS Excel® version 2007, and thus it 
requires this software to operate and function. 
VII.5. Recommendations and Future Works 
Some of the recommendation and future works that can enhance the model and the 
research in general are listed below: 
VII.5.1. Research Enhancement 
The developed model can be enhanced by: 
• More factors can be considered in the model; environmental, physical, operational 
factors and especially the consequence of failure factors. 
• Some of the qualitative factors can be quantified. However, this step requires 
more effort to study in more details the different aspects of each factor. 
• The consequences of failure factors may require more research since they have 
not conceived enough attention or understanding in the industry field and in the 
common practice. 
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• A detailed risk of failure scale and the associated corrective actions can be built 
that best utilize the results of the model to establish water main rehabilitation 
plans. 
VII.5.2. Research Extension 
Future efforts on this research could: 
• Consider a third level of the hierarchy. This will lead to a better understanding 
and evaluation of the risk factors of the second level of the hierarchy (the sixteen 
risk factors considered in this research). As a result, the accuracy of the model 
output will be improved. 
• Incorporate Geographic Information System in the research as the rehabilitation 
plans can also consider grouping water mains that are in the same area in order to 
more efficiently use allocated budgets. 
• Adapt the HFES model to assess the risk of failure of different underground 
infrastructure such as transmission water main and sewer main. 
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APPENDIX A: INTRODUCTION TO FUZZY EXPERT SYSTEM 
A.l. Fuzzy Logic 
L.A. Zadel developed fuzzy logic in the mid-1960s to solve the problem of representing 
approximate knowledge that cannot be represented by conventional, crisp methods. A 
fuzzy set is represented by a membership function. Any "element" value in the universe 
of enclosure of the fuzzy set will have a membership grade which gives the degree to 
which the particular element belongs to the set (Karray and de Silva, 2004). Fuzzy theory 
relies on four main concepts: {X) fuzzy sets: sets with non-crisp, overlapping boundaries; 
(2) linguistic variables: variables whose values are both qualitatively and quantitatively 
described with fuzzy sets; (3) possibility distributions: constraints on the value of a 
linguistic variable imposed by assigning it a fuzzy set; and (4) fuzzy if-then rules: a 
knowledge representation scheme for describing a functional mapping or a logic formula 
that generalizes two-valued logic (Del Campo, 2004). 
A.2. Fuzzy Sets 
A.2.1. Introduction to Fuzzy Sets 
The limitation of classical set theory is that a characteristic function that 
describes a classical (crisp) set can only assume 0 or 1. This can be represented 
as 
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. _ f 1, if x £ A 
V>A W - ( 0 , ifxtA Equation A. 1 
In classical set theory, a definition of a concept (set) does not admit degrees. 
However, by allowing the characteristic function to take a value between 0 and 
1, this limitation and difficulty will be removed. This can be represented by 




for any x G U,[iA(x) G [0,1] is a function that specifies the degree to which element x 
belongs to set A. Set A is called a fuzzy set and the characteristic function nA(x) is called 
a function. (Jin, 2003). A fuzzy set is a set without clear or sharp (crisp) boundaries or 
with no binary membership characteristics. In a fuzzy set, partial membership is possible 
— unlike an ordinary set where each object either belongs or does not belong to the set. A 
simple example that explains this concept is the variable "temperature", which easily 
takes a fuzzy value (e.g., cold, cool, tepid, warm, hot) (Karray and de Silva, 2004). Fuzzy 
sets are suitable for describing sets whose boundaries are not sharply defined. It provides 
an effective way of dealing with uncertainties other than the probability theory (Jin, 
2003). 
A.2.2. Types of Fuzzy Sets 
There are two types of fuzzy sets; discrete and continuous. If the universe of 
enclosure is discrete with elements xt, then the fuzzy set is notated as shown in 
Equation A.3 in which each element is paired with its grade of membership. 
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If the universe of enclosure is continuous, then the notation is given as an integration 
symbol: 
, liA(xt) Equation A.4 
J xt 
X,€U 
It is important to note that these two notations are symbolic shorthand forms of notation 
and are not real summations or integrations (Karray and de Silva, 2004). 
A.3. Fuzzy Operations 
Several methods are available to define the intersection and the union of fuzzy sets. In 
this context, only the classical methods proposed by Zadeh (the inventor of fuzzy logic) 
are introduced because of their simplicity and the analogy with crisp sets. They are 
complement, union, and intersection (Karray and de Silva, 2004). 
A.3.1. Complement Operation 
The complement operation corresponds to negation. The complement is given in the 
following equation and shown graphically in Figure A.l (Karray and de Silva, 2004): 
M / O i ) = 1 ~ / ^ O i ) for all X £ U Equation A.5 








Figure A.l - Representation of a Complement fuzzy logic operation (Karray and de Silva, 2004). 
A.3.2. Union Operation 
The union corresponds to a logical OR operation (called Disjunction), and is denoted by 
A\JB, where A and B are fuzzy sets or fuzzy propositions. The union operation is shown 
in the equation below, and Figure A.2 shows an example (Karray and de Silva, 2004). 
/ ^ U B O ) = max[fiA(x),nB(x)] Vx G U Equation A.6 
Figure A.2 - Representation of a Union fuzzy logic operation (Karray and de Silva, 2004). 
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A.3.3. Intersection Operation 
The intersection operation corresponds to a logical AND operation (called Conjunction) 
and is designated as A n B, where A and B are fuzzy sets or fuzzy propositions. The 
intersection operation is given in the equation below, and a graphical representation is 
shown in Figure A.3 (Karray and de Silva, 2004). 
HAnB(x)=min[nA(x),HB(x)] VxEU Equation A.7 
1 
0 
Figure A.3 - Representation of an Intersection fuzzy logic operation (Karray and de Silva, 2004). 
A.4. Fuzzy Membership Functions 
A membership function is what maps the input space to the output space. It is needed to 
smooth the transition between two regions of memberships; the region completely inside 
the set and the region completely outside the set. There are many forms of membership 
functions, such as: triangle, trapezoid, bell curve, Gaussian, and sigmoid functions (Del 
Campo, 2004). These are not the only available membership functions ~ there are many 
others but these are the principle functions. 
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A.4.1. Triangular Membership Function 
It is the simplest form of membership function. It requires only three parameters to be 








x < a 
a<x<b 
b < x < c 
x > c 
Equation A.8 
The following figure represents a triangle membership function with a = 3, b = 5, and 
c = 7. 
Figure A.4 - Triangular membership function. 
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A.4.2. Trapezoidal Membership Function 
A trapezoidal membership function is characterized by four parameters (a, b, c, d) and is 
represented by the following equation (Del Campo, 2004): 
HA(x) = < 





x < a 
a < x < b 
b < x < c 
c < x < d 
x > d 
Equation A.9 
The following figure represents a trapezoidal membership function with a = 2, b = 4, 
c = 6, and d= 8. 
Figure A.5 - Trapezoidal membership function. 
A.4.3. Gaussian Membership Function 
A Gaussian membership function is defined only by two variables (c, a), and is 
represented by the following equation (Del Campo, 2004): 
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HAOO 
1(X-C\2 
= e 2V a ) 
Equation A. 10 
Graphical representation of the Gaussian membership function is shown in the following 













Figure A.6 - Gaussian membership function. 
A.4.4. Generalized Bell Shape Membership Function 
Bell shaped functions have many different forms. The one most commonly used is the 
Generalized Bell-shaped membership function. It has three control parameters: a controls 
the width of the function, b controls the slope, and c controls the center of the function 
(Del Campo, 2004). It is represented by the following equation and shown graphically as 
an example in Figure A.7 where a = 1,6 = 2, and c = 5. 
/**(*) 
1 + ix — c I a 
126 
Equation A.l 1 
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10 
Figure A.7 - Generalized bell shape membership function. 
A.4.5. Sigmoid Membership Function 
Only two parameters are needed to define a sigmoid membership function. Parameter a 
determines the slope of the membership function and parameter c controls the shift of the 
sigmoid function. It can be represented by the following equation (Del Campo, 2004). 
HA(x) \ _|_
 e-a(x-c) Equation A. 12 
Graphically, it can be drawn as an example in the following figure where a = 2 and c — 4. 
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Figure A.8 - Sigmoid membership function. 
A.5. Fuzzy Rule System 
A rule system consists of a number of rules with a condition part and an action part: 
If condition isx, then action isy. 
The condition part is also known as the rule premise, or simply the IF part. The action 
part is also called the consequent part or the THEN part. A fuzzy rule system uses 
linguistic variables in the if-then relationship. Linguistic variables were defined by Zadeh 
as follows: "A linguistic variable is a variable whose values are sentences in a natural or 
artificial language". For examples, when the values of x are small, middle, large, young, 
not very young, old, then x is a linguistic variable. Generally, each of the fuzzy sets 
corresponds to one linguistic variable and this collection of fuzzy sets is called the "fuzzy 
partition" (the number of fuzzy sets). However, assigning a fuzzy membership set or 
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function to a linguistic variable is a challenging matter and generally there are three 
methods (Jin, 2003): 
• Subjective evaluation and heuristics. The membership function of fuzzy sets can 
be determined based on the experience or intuition of human beings since fuzzy 
sets are intended to model the cognitive process of human beings. 
• Converted frequencies or probabilities. Membership functions can sometimes be 
constructed on the basis of frequency histograms or other probability curves. 
There are a variety of conversion methods, each with its own mathematical and 
methodological strengths and weaknesses. 
• Learning and adaptation. Parameters of fuzzy membership functions can be 
learned or adapted using different optimization methods based on a set of the 
training data. The gradient method and genetic algorithms or reinforcement 
learning are a few examples. This method is the most sophisticated and objective 
method for the determination of membership functions (Jin, 2003). 
A.6. Fuzzy Reasoning Systems 
Fuzzy reasoning is expressed in the IF-THEN rules format discussed above. There are 
only a few types of fuzzy IF-THEN rules (reasoning). Fuzzy reasoning is classified 
roughly into two methods: direct and indirect. The direct method is the most popular, 
whereas the indirect method conducts the reasoning using truth-value space which has a 
relatively complex reasoning mechanism (Tanaka, 1997). This classification is shown in 
Figure A.9. 




Figure A.9 - Classification of fuzzy reasoning. 
A.6.1. Mamdani Method 
The Mamdani method is based on a simple structure of Max and Min operations. 
If x = A, and y = Bj ... THEN z = Ci 
Equation A.0.13 
where x and y are input variables, Ai, and Bi are fuzzy input linguistic values, and z is an 
output variable with Ci the fuzzy output linguistic values. The Mamdani method has an 
advantage over the Takagi-Sugeno-Kang (TSK) method because it is easier to understand 
and the output of the system is defined in terms of fuzzy sets (Gentile, 2004). 
A.6.2. Takagi-Sureno-Kang (TSK) Method 
The TSK model is another version of the Mamdani method. Its rules' form is given as 
Ifx = Aiandy = Bi ... THEN z=/(x,y,...) 
Equation A. 14 
where/can be any function of the input variables taking values in the output variables 
range. The result of the TSK method is a crisp number computed as the average of the 
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outputs of the single rules weighted by the degrees of truth of their antecedents 
(Tettamanzi and Tomassini, 2001). 
A.7. Defuzzification Methods 
This is the last component of a fuzzy logic system. A defuzzification process is needed to 
convert the fuzzy output of fuzzy rules to a crisp value. There are many defuzzification 
strategies that can be followed to produce a crisp output. Some of them are shown below 
(Shi and Sen, 2000): 
• Center of Area: this is the center of gravity of the output membership function. 
• Center of Sum: this method ignores the union operation of membership functions. 
It calculates the center of gravity of each function individually and then average 
weights them by their areas. Thus, it is a faster defuzzification process than Center 
of Area. 
• Height Method: the center of gravity of each membership function for each rule is 
first calculated and then average-weighted by their heights. 
• Middle of Maxima: is the mean value of all the membership means whose 
membership values reach the maximum. 
• First of Maxima: this uses the union of membership functions and takes the 
smallest value of the range with the maximum membership degree. 
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A.8. Use of fuzzy logic in expert systems 
A.8.1. Introduction 
Usually, systems that can process knowledge are called knowledge-based systems. One 
of the most popular and successful knowledge-based systems is the expert system. 
Knowledge can be represented by several forms, such as the logical knowledge 
representation, the procedural knowledge representation, the network knowledge 
representation and the structured knowledge representation. In the logical knowledge 
representation, knowledge is represented by an expression in formal logic. In the 
procedural knowledge, knowledge is described by a set of instructions or rules which can 
be interpreted as a procedure that achieves a goal for a given argument. Both the network 
and the structured knowledge representation schemes represent knowledge using graphs 
(Jin, 2003). Fuzzy logic can be used as a tool to deal with imprecision and qualitative 
aspects that are associated with problem solving and in the development of expert 
systems. Fuzzy expert systems use the knowledge of humans, which is qualitative and 
inexact. In many cases, decisions are to be taken even if the experts may be only partially 
knowledgeable about the problem domain, or when data may not be fully available. The 
reasons behind using fuzzy logic in expert systems may be summarized as follows 
(Karray and de Silva, 2004): 
• The knowledge base of an expert system summarizes the human experts' 
knowledge and experience. 
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• Fuzzy descriptors (e.g., large, small, fast, poor, fine) are commonly used in the 
communication of experts' knowledge, which is often inexact and qualitative. 
• The user's problem description may not be exact. 
• Reasonable decisions are to be taken even if the experts' knowledge base may not 
be complete. 
• Educated guesses need to be made in some situations. 
A.8.2. Fuzzy Knowledge Rules Acquisition 
Fuzzy if-then rule systems are most widely used in fuzzy knowledge representation and 
processing. A fuzzy knowledge system consists of a set of rules such as: 
If x = A, and y = B, ... THEN z = C, 
If x = A2 and y = B2 ... THEN z = C2 
If x = An and y = Bn ... THEN z = Cn 
where x, y are input variables, A(i
 t0 n), B(i t0 n) are fuzzy input linguistic values, z is an 
output variable, and Qi
 ton) are the fuzzy output linguistic values. 
Acquiring knowledge for fuzzy rule base systems can be achieved from human experts or 
from experimental data using several methods. Mainly, there are three different 
approaches (Jin, 2003): 
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• Indirect Knowledge Acquisition. The designer of the knowledge-based system is 
not an expert and usually gathers the necessary knowledge from an expert or an 
experienced operator by various means, such as interviews or questionnaires. 
• Direct Knowledge Acquisition. Here, the designer is an expert. The designer has 
rich knowledge in the related field is also able to formulate his/her knowledge in a 
proper fashion so that it correctly reflects the system. 
• Automatic Knowledge Acquisition. Most automatic knowledge acquisition 
methods are developed in the field of machine learning and artificial intelligence. 
Specific techniques are used, such as neural networks. 
A.8.3. Building Fuzzy Expert Systems 
General rules can be followed in order to build a fuzzy expert system. These can be 
summarized as follows (Jin, 2003; Zayed, 2005): 
1. Determination of the input and the output. 
2. Determination the linguistic terms and their corresponding fuzzy membership 
functions for the input and output variables. It is necessary to determine the 
universe of discourse, the number of fuzzy sets and the associated fuzzy 
membership functions in the fuzzy partitions. 
3. Extraction of fuzzy rules from expert knowledge and common sense following 
direct, indirect, and automatic knowledge acquisition. 
4. The output can be aggregated into a single output number using one of the 
aggregation methods. 
P a g e | 191 
A.9. Fuzzy Rules Generation Techniques 
As the number of inputs and outputs increase, the complexity of the fuzzy system 
increases and the knowledge-based rules extraction process becomes more complicated. 
Thus, more effort by researchers is needed to be exerted to solve this disadvantage of 
fuzzy logic system development. In one effort, a methodology was developed to generate 
fuzzy rules depending on the aggregation of the effect of the factor's "relative 
importance" within the rule block and its "impact on the output" and then normalizing 
these aggregations into the consequent part of the fuzzy rule (Shaheen, 2005). Another 
methodology was developed to extract the fuzzy rules from data, including noise, using 
unsupervised learning with normal information diffusion, called the Information Matrix 
Technique. This method requires the availability of data and does not depend on experts' 
opinions in any way (Huanga and Moraga, 2005). Another method extracts the fuzzy 
rules using neural network and clustering algorithm techniques. However, this method 
also requires the availability of data in order to extract the fuzzy rules from it (Shi et al. 
2002; Del Campo, 2004). 
A.10. Hierarchical fuzzy expert system 
Reducing the total number of rules and their corresponding computation requirements is 
considered one of the important issues in subjective fuzzy logic systems where the 
knowledge base rules are solicited from experts in contrast to the objective fuzzy system 
where the rules are extracted from data. The "Curse of dimensionality" is an attribute of 
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subjective fuzzy systems since the number of rules and thus the complexity increases 
exponentially with the number of variables involved in the model. To solve this problem 
(Curse of dimensionality), the hierarchical fuzzy system is proposed where the system is 
divided into a number of low-dimensional fuzzy systems. This has the advantage that the 
total number of rules increases linearly with the number of input variables. The number 
of rules is greatly reduced by using a hierarchical fuzzy system (Lee et al. 2003). Mainly, 
there are many approaches to deal with the output of one layer to be the input of the next 
layer. One is that the output of the last layer as a crisp value can be used as the input of 
the next layer in the hierarchical fuzzy system. The advantage of this approach is that it 
will reduce the uncertainty of the new result by reducing the number of the fired rules in 
the new layer, but at the expense of the information of uncertainty, which is lost. Another 
approach is to consider the fuzzy output of the last layer as the fuzzy input of the next 
layer, which would preserve the information about uncertainty. However, if the fuzzy set 
is too wide, it will fire too many rules in the new layer resulting in a very uncertain result. 
Another approach is to decompose the defuzzification of the output that is used as input 
in the new layer into two or more crisp singletons. A different approach is to use only a 
part of the fuzzy output with a membership degree greater than (0.4) and convert the 
result into a triangle membership function whose base values resulted from the 
membership degree cut as shown in Figure A. 10 (Gentile, 2004). 
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£1=1.0 Modified fuzzy output 
Defuzzified output for 
original fuzzy output 
Figure A.10 - Fuzzy output used as input for the new layer. 
A.11. Fuzzy Logic Advantages 
Fuzzy logic has many advantages which make it a suitable technique for 
modeling and control problems, some of these advantages are (Lee, 2006): 
1) It does not require precise inputs and the output control is a smooth control 
function in spite of the broad variations of the inputs. 
2) Fuzzy logic is not limited to a certain number of inputs and outputs. 
3) It can deal with information that would be difficult or impossible to model 
mathematically. 
4) It is easily adjusted by simply changing the rules. 
5) It saves time when compared to conventional mathematical methods. 
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A.12. Fuzzy Logic Disadvantages 
Although Fuzzy Logic has many advantages over conventional mathematical methods, 
some limitations are inherent to fuzzy logic such as (Lee, 2006): 
1) It lacks self-organizing and self-tuning mechanisms. 
2) The knowledge base rules definition and the fuzzy system quickly becomes complex 
when too many inputs and outputs are used in developing a fuzzy model. 
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APPENDIX B: SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. Cover Page 
Risk of water main Failure Fuzzy Expert System 
Risk of failure is defined as the combination of the probability and impact severity of a 
particular circumstance (failure) that negatively impacts the ability of infrastructure assets 
to meet the objectives of the municipality. Several factors play roles in water mains 
pipelines risk of failure. These factors are classified in this research as environmental, 
physical, operational, and post-failure factors. The identification of the weights and 
effects of these factors on water-mains risk of failure is crucial to identify the most risky 
water-main pipelines and to take the suitable measures to mitigate their risks. The expert 
opinions gathered by this questionnaire will be used in building a fuzzy expert system to 
predict the risk of failure index of the network pipelines. 
As the expert system is mainly dependent on experts' judgment and experience, we 
prepared this questionnaire trying to translate and integrate your valuable judgment into 
our expert system. This questionnaire consists of three parts. In the first part, general 
information about the expert is collected. In the second part, the expert is required to give 
weights to the factors considered in our expert system. In the third part, the expert is 
asked to evaluate the performance variables (attributes) of the factors. 
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Your cooperation with us to advance the knowledge of water-mains infrastructure is 
highly appreciated. 
Supervisor, 
Tarek Zayed, Ph.D., P.E. 
Associate Professor 
Department of Building, Civil & Environmental Engineering 
EV 6.401,1515 Ste. Catherine St., Montreal, Canada H3G 1M8 




Please, return this questionnaire to -pel.: 
Hussam Fares E-mail: 
Research Assistant, 
Department of Building, Civil & Environmental 
Engineering, 
Concordia University 
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2. Questionnaire 
The following table is confidential and not to be exposed to public. 
1 - Name: 
2 - Institution: 
3 - Title: 
4 - No. of years of experience: 
The following table collects the weight of the risk of water main failure factors. This can 
be the answer to the question "What is the strength of the factor in contributing to the 











Weights Risk sub-factor 
Soil Type 
Daily Traffic 









Cost of Repair 
Damage to surroundings 
Loss of Production 
Traffic Disruption 
Type of Serviced Area 
Sub-factors 
weights 
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The behaviors of only three factors of the factors listed above are not known to me and I 
am strongly in need of possession of this information. For each risk sub-factors attributes, 
please choose a number using this scale: 























<= 250 mm (redundant) 
between 250 to 500 mm (redundant) 
<= 250 mm (not redundant) 
between 250 to 500 mm (not redundant) 
Consequence 
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